This website is updated by Amanda Tattersall, an Australian union and community activist and academic. There is a new site called Power in Coalition, released in August 2010, that has information on community unionism and community coalitions based on my book Power in Coalition.
The structure of this site is as follows:
First, are a series of research papers I have published or delivered on the topic of community unionism and union-community coalitions.
Secondly, are a series of diagrams and training documents prepared to train union and community organisers and members on how to develop effective community union practice.
Thirdly, is an annotated bibliography of some of the articles I have found very useful for defining and exploring the term.
Fourthly, it provides the contact details and research areas of several key academics in USA, Canada, UK and Australia who are working on this important topic.
If you have any materials you would like displayed on this site, or any other comments, feel free to email.
Also, apologies for the confusing blog format - to find the different sections, scroll down the page.
]]>Generalhttp://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=17Mon, 25 Oct 2010 14:02:00 -0700<![CDATA[Book: Power in Coalition]]>
http://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=30
Coalitions can be important tools for social change and union revitalisation. What makes them successful? What causes them to fail? Community organiser Amanda Tattersall in Power in Coalition examines successful coalitions between unions and community organisations in three countries: the public education coalition in Sydney, Toronto’s Ontario Health Coalition fighting to save universal health care, and Chicago’s living wage campaign run by the Grassroots Collaborative. She explores when and how coalitions can be a powerful strategy for social change, organisational development and union renewal.
The Power in Coalition website is designed for researchers and organizers (organisers) to provide up-to-date commentary, research and training materials on coalitions between unions and community organizations (organisations). It accompanies the publication of Power in Coalition by Cornell University Press and (Allen & Unwin in Australia) in 2010.
You can purchase the book through Cornell University Press (for international audiences):
‘If unions are to maximise their influence in the 21st century they must build alliances with other organisations around economic, social and ecological concerns effecting humanity. This book shows it is possible to build the necessary coalitions to achieve this end.’
Jack Mundey, instigator of the 1970s Green Bans movement in Sydney
‘At last a scholar/activist who understands that coalitions are not merely a way of advancing union goals! Building on three successful coalitions in Australia, Canada, and the United States, Amanda Tattersall identifies three main mechanisms that lead to successful coalition formation between unions and community organizations: identifying common concerns, building organizational relationships, and finding the right scale. She shows how unions can transcend the narrow corporatism of ‘business unionism’ to return to the social movements they once were in a world that has become more complex and more indifferent to the needs of both workers and communities.’
Professor Sidney Tarrow, Cornell University
‘Amanda Tattersall’s book is the most insightful study of coalitions to date. It is not your typical gauzy view of coalition building, but offers a clear-sighted, practical road map to building more effective labor-community coalitions and in turn an opportunity to transform the labor movement.’
Jeff Blodgett, Executive Director, Wellstone Action
‘Essential reading for anyone who wants to understand how to build the power of working people in a changing world, Amanda Tattersall’s book is at once timely, practical, inspiring and challenging. Combining analysis of action with useful theory, it provides an important new tool for activists everywhere—in unions or beyond them—who want to build sustained and sustaining coalitions that have the potential to change the world.’
Professor Barbara Pocock, Director, Centre for Work + Life, University of South Australia
]]>Generalhttp://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=30Fri, 20 Aug 2010 04:57:00 -0700<![CDATA[Paper: Coalitions and Community Unionism]]>
http://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=29
Coalitions and Community Unionism: Using the term community to explore effective union-community collaboration
Abstract
Union-community collaboration is an increasingly common practice in industrialised nations where union power and density have declined. Purpose: This article proposes a framework for defining and evaluating community unionism, through a definition of the term ‘community.’ Findings and originality: It defines the term community in three discrete but mutually reinforcing ways, as (community) organisation; common interest identity, and local neighbourhood or place. The term is used to then define community unionism as three discrete union strategies, and finally to examine one type of community unionism – coalition unionism. The paper identifies three elements of coalition unionism. Successful coalition practice is defined by partner organisational relationships (coalition structure, bridge brokers and coalition offices); common concern (common interest operates as mutual direct interest of organisation and members), and the element of scale (where success increases as coalitions operate at multiple scales such as the local, as well as the scale of government and/or business decision makers). Methodology: I explore this framework drawing on campaigns in Sydney and Chicago.
Union-community collaboration is growing in industrialised countries as unions seek to align themselves with external community organisations, interest groups, or operate to dominate a geographic place in order to enhance their political and economic power. Yet, terms such as community and community unionism are ambiguous. They have loose meanings in union scholarship and practice. As Moody observes, community is a vague concept (Moody 1990).
This paper attempts to build a concrete understanding of one example of community unionism – coalitions between unions and community organisations. In doing so, the paper suggests a definition of the term community, and from this, the term community unionism. It then outlines an approach to understanding coalition unionism, suggesting three elements that define coalitions and measures that explain how they vary. This approach is explained using examples from long term coalitions in Sydney and Chicago.
Thus the purpose of the paper is two-fold. First proposing a concrete definition of community unionism, and second exploring what makes coalition unionism successful.
1.0 From Community to Community Unionism
The term community appeared in industrial relations scholarship as union renewal strategies such as union-community coalitions re-surfaced in the 1990s. Union density in the US, Australia, Canada and the UK has fallen over the last twenty years (Visser 2003; Frege 2006). Factors for the decline include international economic competition, anti-union legislation and shifts in local industries from unionised manufacturing to non-union services (Peetz 1998). Union decline has prompted national union movements to debate strategies for union renewal, where unions revitalise their internal structures and strategies, grow and develop their membership and rebuild their external relationships to increase their power in the workplace and in the political arena (Levesque and Murray 2002).
As Cranford and Ladd note, discussions of community have surfaced in times of union crisis (Cranford and Ladd 2003, p.51). In the 1990s in the US, the term community was commonly used to describe coalitions. Banks used the phrase community unionism to describe alliances, and Brecher and Costello’s inaugural book on coalitions, used the phrase ‘labour-community coalition’ to describe the strategy of coalitions between unions and community organisations (Brecher and Costello 1990a; Banks 1992).
Discussions of union ‘community’ strategies are also common across the industrialised world. Tufts work on hotel worker coalition in Canada, Ellem and Rainnie’s work on community unionism in regional Australia and Wills work on London Citizens all focus on the importance of unions campaigning on issues beyond wages and conditions and with community organisation partners to increase their influence against employers and the state (Tufts 1998; Wills 2001; Ellem 2003; Wills and Simms 2004; Rainnie and Ellem forthcoming).
While the term community is used to describe coalitions, it is also used elsewhere to describe other union and workplace organising strategies including worker centres, union’s campaigning on issues beyond wages and conditions, and to describe a complex set of networks based on place, identity and culture (Patmore 1994; Thornwaite 1997; Taksa 2000; Fine 2005a).
The competing uses of the term community unsettle the meaning of the term community unionism. Consequently, in Canada, the US and Australia, interest in union renewal has led to significant debate about the meaning of the term community unionism (ACREW 2006; Cranford, Das Gupta, Ladd et al. 2006; McBride and Greenwood 2006; UnionsNSW 2006; Tattersall 2006a; McBride and Greenwood forthcoming).
Building a definition of community can provide a conceptual foundation for the term community unionism and particular strategies such as coalitions. While there are competing interpretations of the meaning of community, there are some consistent themes (Tattersall forthcoming a). Most commonly, the term community is used as a short-cut for community organisation, for example in the term union-community coalition (Brecher and Costello 1990a; Tufts 1998; Nissen 2004). Secondly community is used to describe a group of people who have common interests or identities, such as a community of women or environmentalists (Taksa 2000; Cranford and Ladd 2003; Fine 2005a). Thirdly, community is used to mean place, as in a defined geographic area such as a local neighbourhood community (Ellem 2003; Wills and Simms 2004).
These three discrete definitions can be seen as complementary, not mutually exclusive. They emphasise different elements of community and providing a concrete anchor for exploring terms such as union-community coalitions and community unionism (Tattersall forthcoming a).
If community is defined as meaning organisation, common identity/interest, and place, then one approach to the term community unionism that it describes the set of strategies that consists of union collaboration with these elements of community. This conceptualisation of community unionism tries to concretise the multiple definitions of the term in existing literature.
The term community unionism was first used by O’Connor in 1964 and then by Students for a Democratic Society, in their creation of ‘community unions’ as community-based, worker focused organisations in the United States (O'Connor 1964; O'Connor 1964; Frost 2001). Similarly the United Auto Workers and the civil rights movement used the term community unionism to describe 1960s community organisations that sought to organise the urban working poor in the US (Flug 1990; Fine 2003). The term was revived in the 1990s to instead refer to alliances between unions and community organisations (Banks 1992; Tufts 1998; Lipsig-Mumme 2003; Tattersall 2006a). Later in the 1990s, the term community union has again been used to refer to community-based organising strategies that target workers on the basis of common identity, gender and ethnicity in a common geographic place (Cranford and Ladd 2003; Black 2005; Fine 2005a; Cranford, Das Gupta, Ladd et al. 2006). Labour geographers have also seized on the term community unionism, using it to describe the strategic importance of connections between unions and place, the spatiality of these relationships and thus the explicit spatiality of community (Wills 2001; Ellem 2003; Wills and Simms 2004; Ellem 2005).
Rather than debating the relative merits of alliances, place or concern as the ‘correct’ meaning of community unionism (Black 2005), I categorise community unionism as building upon each of these three components. I argue that community unionism refers to three different types of organising strategies, each representing a connection between unions and the three definitions of community.
Firstly, community unionism describes when unions work with community organizations in coalition, what I call coalition unionism. This is consistent with Banks, Tufts and Lipsig-Mumme’s interpretation of the term (Banks 1992; Tufts 1998; Lipsig-Mumme 2003; Cutcher 2004; Tattersall 2006a). Coalitions develop when ‘community’ organizations and unions work together.
Secondly, community unionism also describes the strategy of seeking to organize workers on the basis of common non-workplace identities, interests or place. This interpretation connects to interpretations of community unionism as an organizational strategy, whether operating as worker centers, union organizing strategies or coalition strategies. Here, recruitment strategies, commitment and political activity to engage workers connects to community-based identities rather than craft or industry (Cranford and Ladd 2003; Urano and Stewart 2005; Fine 2005a; Cranford, Das Gupta, Ladd et al. 2006).
Thirdly, community unionism describes place-based organizing strategies. These are union strategies that seek to increase a union’s impact at any particular scale: local, city-wide, state, nationally or globally. For instance, the term community unionism was used to describe the practices of mining unions in the Pilbara region of Western Australia, when unions worked with local organizations and individuals to improve hospital services and gain support from the town in their fight against mining giant Rio Tinto (Ellem 2003; Rainnie and Ellem forthcoming). It also describes the desire for unions ‘to go global’ and strengthen global federations and global union partnerships, where unions act at the scale of the global community (Tattersall 2007b). Peak council strategies are also place-based community unionism strategies (Colburn 2004; Reynolds and Ness 2004; Wills and Simms 2004).
This three pronged definition of community unionism seeks to capture the different historical and contemporary meanings of the term to describe various union practices and forms of union renewal.
To get a copy of the article ... email amandatattersall@gmail.com]]>Generalhttp://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=29Mon, 05 Nov 2007 16:06:00 -0700<![CDATA[Research Paper: Similar themes between US and Australian coalitions]]>
http://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=26
The Shifting Power of Labor-Community Coalitions: Identifying Common Elements of Powerful Coalitions in Australia and the USA
This paper will be published in the journal Working USA, and is jointly authored by David Reynolds and Amanda Tattersall.
Abstract
This paper presents and explores a theoretical framework of common features across labor-community coalitions. While researchers in both the U.S. and Australia have written about labor-community coalitions, most of this work has focused on profiling “best practices” rather than building a framework for understanding coalition such work in general. This paper argues that all coalitions are defined by four common elements: the nature of common concern, the structure of organizational relationships, organizational capacity and commitment, and the scale of coalition activity. It then uses these elements to identify four different ideal types of coalitions, varying from ad hoc coalitions, to simple coalitions, to mutual interest coalitions to deep coalitions. The paper illustrates the usefulness of this framework by using it to examine sample coalition experiences in the U.S. and Australia. The Australian case displays variation in coalition type within a single ongoing campaign around public education. By contrast, eight sample U.S. living wage efforts demonstrate variation in coalition type among different campaigns.
An exerpt from the paper:
A key issue for contemporary political activism is how labor unions and community organizations can work together effectively in coalition. Coalitions are a strategy increasingly used by unions and community organizations to enhance their power and campaign success. While there is a significant body of literature on coalitions, it often describes ‘best coalition practice ‘rather than identifying the core analytical elements that shape coalition effectiveness. This paper seeks to contribute to an analytical framework of coalitions, making suggestions about how real existing coalition practice can be improved by identifying generalizable features of powerful coalitions. We present a framework of coalitions that identifies four key elements of effective coalition practice, and then apply this framework to two case studies of different coalitions –the Public Education Campaign in Australia and Living Wage coalitions in the United States. Our aim is to demonstrate that there are several key similar elements to coalition operation and success. The case studies have been selected to highlight how coalitions can powerfully engage union members both on issues of wages and work conditions (such as in the US case study) as well as on broader social concerns (such as in the Australian case study), exploring how the issue base of coalitions can vary and still produce powerful bases for union coalition practice.
Labor-Community Coalitions: an introduction
In the early 1990s there was a renewal of interest in the possibilities of labor-community coalitions (Brecher and Costello 1990a; Banks 1992). The need to rebuild union power and union density included a concern for working in coalition with community organisations. In the USA, the formation of the Jobs with Justice network, the Union Cities program at the AFL-CIO, living wages campaigns and the Justice for Janitors campaigns revived interest in how coalitions could create union power (Banks 1990; Ness and Eimer 2001; Reynolds and Kern 2002; Reynolds 2004). Today, the idea that unions should working with community organisations is a prominent element of union renewal strategies.
Yet, too often in both union practice and academic literature labor-community coalitions are seen as a homogenous panacea for union power or campaign success. Coalitions are seen as a tactic, one element of a comprehensive campaign. While coalitions are not the only strategy for building union power or renewal, this paper argues that the form, agenda and power that unions can gain from coalitions is highly variable, and must be categorized and measured. Indeed, the form and capacity of coalitions vary significantly, from fleeting ad hoc solidarity support to long-term sustainable relationships (Tattersall 2005). Yet the current literature on labor-community coalitions has tended to document best practice as a guide for effective coalition action. Descriptive best practice case studies have usefully given credence to the important role that coalitions can play as part of union strategies, yet, they tend to not identify the factors that created success (Byrd and Rhee 2004; Frank and Wong 2004; Luce and Nelson 2004). This paper seeks to identify some common repeatable elements of successful coalitions, rather than merely documenting an example of a coalition for others to copy. In doing so, it aims to identify elements of coalitions occur across all coalition practice, rather than simply in so-called ‘best practice’.
Four Factors of Coalition Practice
We identify four elements that vary coalition effectiveness, including the form of common concern and purpose at the heart of a coalition, the structure of a coalition, the degree of organizational buy-in, and the context of the coalition’s activity. We then pull together these factors to present a map of varying coalition forms, ranging from simple ad-hoc coalitions to more complex and powerful deep coalitions.
Common Concern
At the heart of labor-community coalitions is a bond of common concern between different organizations; yet the degree of mutuality of common interest in coalitions varies considerably. Common concern refers both to the alignment of organizational interests that define the purpose of the coalition, and the social frame that the coalition uses to communicate its strategy to the broader public (Tattersall forthcoming b).
At one extreme, unions and community organizations frequently come together on an ad hoc basis where the issue at the heart of the campaign is one-side’s agenda (Tattersall 2005). These are the most common forms of engagement, and include requests for speakers at rallies or participation in an information picket. The interest connection to these ad hoc coalitions is often uneven; focused on the party requesting support. A lack of interest in coalition activity minimizes the desire for supportive organisations to participate in these ad hoc coalitions. Phrases such as ‘rent a collar’ are commonly used by the religious community and capture a resentment that comes from being asked to speak at ad hoc events without being involved more deeply in campaign strategy, or having their interests reflected in campaign demands (interview, community organisation, Chicago, 2005).
When the common interest between union and community organizations is shared, the commitment to acting in coalition is strengthened (Brecher and Costello 1990b). When an organisation’s own interests are also in interest of the coalition, participation increases as coalition strategies directly contribute to organizational goals. Consequently, coalitions increase their level of inter-organizational participation when they operate with concerns that are in the mutual self-interest of participants (Childs 1990; Altemose and McCarty 2001; Frege, Heery et al. 2004; Tattersall 2005; Tattersall 2006a). In addition, the more direct and tangible their organizational interest, the deeper their likely engagement. Thus a union may give financial support or speak at a rally on an issue such as peace, which ignites its altruistic concerns for justice or general concern for corporate globalization. By contrast, a union organizing health care workers is more likely to directly engage and activate its members in a campaign to increase funding for the health care sector because the outcomes of the campaign will directly affect union members (Tattersall 2006a). The degree of organizational commitment to an issue increases the ability of a coalition to activate its members and its relationships, increasing the strength of the coalition overall.
Aside from organizational interest, common concern also refers to the social frame that a coalition uses to communicate its message. Thus common interest can be effective not only when it operates in the mutual self-interest of participating organisations, but when it is framed as a social vision for working people as a whole (Snow and Benford 1992; Reynolds 2004; Lakoff 2005). This broader community frame not only engages organization members, but assists the campaign to become a direct concern of the general public. Direct organizational interest does not disappear so much as it becomes embedded in a larger social agenda. For instance, a campaign for better pay for health care workers extends into a campaign about better hospitals – where conditions such as staff-patient ratios, quality and price of medicine and quality of treatment are also connected to pay. The campaign becomes a holistic campaign for health care in which workers concerns are embedded.
The strategic intentions of a coalition are a critical measure of sustainability; whether a coalition has been formed for a short term tactical event or a long term power building structure. The distinction between an ad hoc immediate concern and a social vision for working people points to this, where coalitions formed around a larger definition of concern can lead to ongoing cooperation around multiple campaigns. For example, cooperation between local ACORN chapters and central labor councils has been in evident in many living wage campaigns. The immediate interest uniting the two organizations is the goal of passing a living wage law. Whether the two continue to cooperate after a campaign is over depends on the interest in and availability of other issues around which to cooperate. Yet in a much smaller number of cases (such as in San Jose or Little Rock) ACORN and a central labor council have united around a broader mutual goal of building power as organizations. The two organizations may cooperate on specific campaigns, however both during and between campaigns a relationship continues in which the partners work to build each other’s capacity. In San Jose, for example, this ongoing cooperation has taken the form of a joint door-knocking organizing team that recruits new ACORN members as well as pro-labor voters and possible organizing contacts.
The Structure of the Coalition
Coalitions are also defined by the structure of their organizational relationships. At one extreme labor unions and community organizations can interrelate without establishing a formal decision making structure; the relationships can be based on requests rather than joint meetings (Tattersall 2005). In these cases campaign strategy and decision making remains the property of the initiating organizations, limiting broad organizational engagement (Frege, Heery et al. 2004).
Beyond ad hoc engagement, a variety of structural forms can exist, ranging from simple coalitions to deep coalitions. A key variable in coalition structure is the extent to which the participating organizations are able to share influence over campaign tactics and strategy. When a coalition is dominated by a single partner, or when it is organized quickly in reaction to an event, decision making is more likely to be hasty and share less ownership between the organizations (Tufts 1998). Indeed, when informal planning outside the coalition dominates the strategic direction of the campaign, the coalition is reduced to a formal space for reporting on decisions rather than making them. When organizations are not given control over campaign strategy they are likely to have less commitment to taking action.
Coalitions are more likely to be long term and have broad organizational support if campaign strategy is brokered among the organizations and coalition decision making is shared (Banks 1992; Tufts 1998). Organizational interconnection is enhanced if there are open spaces for decision making and if there are informal ties that help bridge across cultural differences between the organizations (Rose 2000; Obach 2004). An effective coalition structure builds organizational trust and accountability. This might mean that the coalition builds a closed structure, where organizations are hand picked as partners, rather than having organizations join as ‘come one come all’ (Tattersall 2006a; Tattersall 2006b) For example the Chicago Living Wage Coalition supporting the big box living wage ordinance was widely endorsed, but to participate in the steering committee organisations were hand picked depending on their ability to make a concrete commitment to the coalition’s capacity. Organizations may be chosen because of common cultures, common organizing methods or a common commitment to objectives.
In addition, coalitions might build sustainable structures where the logistics of joint work can be undertaken by an independent coalition office with staff rather than draining the time and being influenced by resource rich organizational partners (Nissen 2000; Tattersall 2005). For example, since its founding in 1988 as a multi-issue, multi-constituency coalition of roughly 30 groups, the Minnesota Alliance for Progressive Action has sponsored a series of key public policy campaigns and is maintained by a permanent coalition office and staff (Petersen 2004).
Finally, a coalition may be more sustainable and able to accommodate conflict and cultural differences between organisations if there are bridge builders involved in coalition practice. Bridge builders are individuals with social movement and union experience, who can translate cultural differences and support formal strategic planning and informal relationship building (Rose 2000; Obach 2004)
Organizational Capacity and Commitment
A key component of both structure and common interest is the need to enhance union and community organization commitment to campaigning. Organizational buy-in and the extent to which participant organizations mobilize for coalition objectives provides another measure of coalition effectiveness.
The spectrum of organizational buy-in is well-understood in the language of coalition practice. At one extreme, organizers often talk about ‘paper coalitions’ or ‘astroturf coalitions’ where organizations sign on to a letterhead or press release, but the relationships do not go deep. A deeper form of engagement is colloquially described as ‘grass tops coalitions’ where organizational engagement is focused in organization staff, but not members. The seniority of the participants in coalition meetings is often a mark of organizational buy in, the more senior the decision makers, the greater the authority invested in the coalition and the faster the decision making process (Nissen 2004; Tattersall 2006a). An even deeper form of engagement is ‘grassroots’ coalition organizing, where leaders and members are directly engaged in public roles at coalition events, decision making and planning. This operates at its deepest level when organizational members are engaged in coalition broker organisations, locally based coalition organisations which enable union and community organisation members to control campaign planning and strategy (Tattersall forthcoming e). A good example is the Ontario Health Coalition, which has a central provincial coalition and thirty-five local health coalitions which together coordinate health campaigns (Tattersall 2006b).
However, in most coalition practice there is often weak organizational buy-in because coalitions tend to limit in-depth participation and decision making to staff and leadership rather than members (Clawson 2003). Coalition campaigns often relegate union and community organization members to the role of ‘rent-a-crowd’ rather than providing them with space for meaningful participation. This may be mitigated when community organizations or unions closely tie internal decision making processes and buy-in to coalition practice, or where centralized state or city-based coalitions create local broker organisations.
Coalitions that achieve successful organizational buy-in require significant union buy-in. As Nissen notes, out of all coalition partners, unions usually have the largest number of resources at their disposal; they usually have the largest number of members and the largest base of independent funds (Nissen 2003; Nissen 2004). Signs of deepening union commitment include sending senior staff and officials as decision makers to coalition meetings, freeing up funds to allocate to the campaign, activating external union political and organizational relationships to enfranchise the coalition’s agenda and being willing to activate member involvement in coalition events.
The Scale and Opportunities of Coalition activity
Coalitions can also be distinguished by the scale or scales at which they operate. Scale is a term used by labor geographers to understand how power is constituted by place and space (Massey 1984; Herod 1997; Fagan 2000). Power is conditioned by the scale at which it operates, for instance industries, corporations and politics operates at multiple scales and can be influenced at different scales. Industries and firms that rely on local consumer populations, or locally scaled production – such as cleaning, mining, human service work and the pubic sector – may be ‘fixed’ to certain places of consumer demand or producer services (Herod 1997; Walsh 2000; Ellem 2003). In contrast to the perceived mobility of capital, capital fixes and political representation provide spaces of influence for coalitions and social movements. Where capital or political representatives are tied to places, through industry or political representation, organizing coalition and union support in those places enhances the power of unions and the capacity for social change (Tattersall forthcoming e).
At a basic form, coalitions can operate at any scale – the local to the global. Yet, when working to influence government or employers, it may increase the power of a coalition to operate at multiple scales. Locally scaled coalitions can increase influence over ‘fixed’ industries or political leaders, such as the broker organisations in Ontario that are based around regional hospitals and in swing ridings (congressional districts) (Tattersall 2006b). Multi-scaled coalitions, that can act locally, nationally and globally, can also allow coalitions to exercise influence against powerful international firms while also building local public support for coalition outcomes (Banks and Russo 1999; Juravich and Bronfenbrenner 2003; Tattersall forthcoming a). For instance, the SEIU’s Driving up Standards campaign seeks to build international union and coalition support for union demands in the UK as well as support from parents to lobby US school boards (Tattersall forthcoming a).
Moreover, as Wills notes, coalition effectiveness is enhanced when the relationships it brings together are proximate and participatory, and therefore local (Martin, Sunley et al. 1993; Wills 2002). Locally based coalitions are able to harness community ties, because it is at the local level where people work, live and can directly participate in decisions and action. Coalitions that seek to mobilize and coordinate organizations or individuals with a history of acting together, or in a common place are more likely to sustain longer term activity (Jonas 1998).
The pioneering corporate accountability campaign in Minnesota illustrates the utility of multiple scales. On the surface, the Minnesota Alliance for Progressive Action organized a state-level campaign to pass increasingly effective legislation reforming how businesses received tax breaks and other public financial support. Although the state sets the legal framework for such subsidies the actual decision to grant aid occurs at the local level. Thus, the campaign proved effective because it not simply changed the state rules, but also supported local coalitions in several parts of the state that organized to ensure that stronger standards become actual reality at the local level. Without effective local scale, the state reforms could have become dust-filled abstract rules in the legal code.
Additionally, coalitions are able to enhance their influence if their social movement activity is integrated with available political opportunities. Social movement theorists argue that where social movements are more able to have political success, then they are more able to be sustained (Tarrow 1994). Thus, where there are election cycles, divisions between the ruling political parties or legislative timetables that can be exploited by coalitions, coalitions are more likely to successfully achieve political outcomes (Tarrow 1994; Reynolds 2004; Tattersall forthcoming e).
Four Types of Coalitions
The above discussion points to four forces that influence coalition types. Common concern, the structure of the relationship, organizational commitment and the scale and opportunity of the coalition relationship are key elements that vary to produce different types of coalitions. Indeed, we suggest that they simultaneously define all coalitions as well as operating as the key forces that produce coalition variation over time. Thus coalitions shift in their internal resources and external capacity to the extent that issues are held in single or mutual interest, that structure is tight and trustworthy or fleeting, that organizational commitment is superficial or significant and if coalitions can operate at multiple scales and can harness political opportunities.
Thus, not only do the above elements work to describe key aspects of coalitions broadly, but they can also be combined to produce a four part typology of labor-community coalition practice (see figure 1). This is a categorization of different ideal types of coalition forms.
]]>Generalhttp://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=26Sun, 10 Dec 2006 14:01:41 -0700<![CDATA[Paper: A little help from our friends]]>
http://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=25
Abstract
Union renewal and coalition unionism are widely considered necessary, however the different factors that provoke union engagement in coalitions is an under-theorized area of scholarship. This article develops a framework using the term community and the dialectic of opportunity and choice to explore likely factors for long-term union coalitions with community organisations. It then explores this framework by comparing two case studies of union engagement in long-term coalitions in Australia and Canada. The article finds that the dialectic of opportunities and choices is critical, and in particular emphasizes the role of pre-existing union identities, and common interest and decentralized union structures for generating deep union engagement. It highlights that unions are likely to engage in coalition unionism when there is a coincidence of crisis and perceived opportunity for coalition practice, while noting that the depth of union engagement is greatly affected by the type of union actors that initiates coalition participation (whether officials, factions, organizers or delegates). The article finds that different passages for coalition unionism are possible, and they can originate inside unions or be provoked externally by coalitions. It stresses that union leadership support for coalition unionism may be necessary for coalition practice, but it is not sufficient for generating deep union engagement in coalitions.
There is a hope that union renewal is possible. Yet indicators of when a shift to renewal is likely to occur are uncertain, and often a secondary focus of scholarship. Some suggest that union-community coalitions (labor-community coalitions) are one example of renewal (Frege, Heery et al. 2004; Reynolds 2004; Turner forthcoming). Long-term coalitions between unions and community organisations, or coalition unionism, is said to be an important source of power and renewal for unions who are suffering from a crisis of density, lack of political influence or needing to build a broader social agenda (Tattersall 2005).
This article focuses on the question of coalitions, often called labor-community coalitions, beginning with the meaning of the term community. It then presents a framework of the opportunities and choices that make an individual union more likely to engage in coalitional unionism. This framework is then explored in two comparative case studies – the NSW Teachers Federation’s collaboration with the Public Education Alliance in Sydney Australia and the Canadian Union of Public Employees collaboration with the Ontario Health Coalition in Canada.
1. What is Community?
Terms such as labor-community coalitions, coalition unionism and community unionism have a contested and uncertain meaning, in part due to the ambiguity of the term ‘community.’ However, while the term community is loosely deployed across union renewal literature, there are some consistent themes (Tattersall 2006a). Most commonly, the term community is used as a surrogate for the phrase community organisation, for example in the term labor-community coalition (Brecher and Costello 1990a; Tufts 1998). Secondly community is used to describe a group of people who have common interests or identities, such as a community of women or environmentalists (Cranford and Ladd 2003; Fine 2005). Thirdly, community is used to mean place, as in a defined geographic area such as a local neighborhood community (Ellem 2003). These three discrete definitions are complementary and supplementary, defining the attributes of community and providing a concrete anchor for exploring terms such as labor-community coalitions, coalition unionism and community unionism (Tattersall 2006a). See figure 1.
Figure 1: The threefold dimensions of community (included at end)
Thus, union collaboration with the community, or what I term community unionism, can include one of three different practices (Tattersall 2006a). It can include working in coalition with community organisations (Banks 1992; Tufts 1998). It can include unions or community organisations acting with a broad common ‘community’ or class interest or acting with people with a specific identity (Cranford and Ladd 2003; Fine 2005). Or, community unionism can include acting with a place-specific strategy where unions seek to work across a specific geographic area, using local support to enhance union influence and power (Ellem 2005). This article explores one of these practices in detail – coalition unionism – when unions collaborate with community organisations, asking when long term collaboration likely to develop.
Not only can the definition of community define community unionism, but it also defines the different elements of coalition unionism (Tattersall 2006a). Coalitions have organizational features, operating with different types of organizational relations; they have common interest or identity features, operating with different degrees of common concern between organisations, and coalitions have place based features as they engage with the external world, operating with scalar dimensions (Tattersall 2006a; Tattersall 2006c). Thus the term community can also be a guide for understanding the operation and variations of coalition unionism.
]]>Generalhttp://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=25Fri, 22 Sep 2006 16:04:00 -0700<![CDATA[Paper: Common Themes in Community Unionism in Industrialised Countries]]>
http://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=23
This paper was presented at the European Group on Organizational Studies colloquium, sub theme 38: social movement unionism, in Bergen Oslo, 7-9 July 2006.
Union revitalisation strategies in industrialised countries include attempts by unions to reach out to community organisations and engage in community unionism. One form of community unionism is the long term coalition between unions and community organisations. This paper develops a definition of community and community unionism, identifying three key elements that vary coalition practice – organisational relationships, common concern and multi-scalar capacity. These elements are explored in a comparison of the public education campaigns in NSW and the Ontario Health Coalition in Ontario. I find that both case studies develop successful and sustainable forms of community unionism, while also reflecting stark variations in these three elements. I use these two case studies to speculate about how variations in community unionism operate. For instance I argue that there is an ‘agenda-participatory’ form of community unionism, evident in the public education campaign, where there was strong common concern and multi-scalar capacity without a strong structure of organisational relationships. I argue there is a ‘structure-participatory’ form of community unionism, in the Ontario Health Coalition campaign, where there was a strong organisational structure and multi-scalar capacity without a deep common concern connection. The paper highlights that while each of these forms of community unionism contribute to union power, they provide unions with different sources of power and achieve their success as coalitions in different ways.Download the paper:
An extract:
The concept of community unionism is built on the idea that union connection to the community builds successful campaigns and strengthens unions. This paper investigates how and when this might occur, focusing first on achieving a concrete definition of community, second by establishing a framework for understanding the contours of successful community unionism and finally exploring this framework through a comparison of two case studies of community unionism from Australia and Canada.
The term community has entered union discourse as union density and power, particularly in the industrialised world, has diminished. While work between unions and community organisations is not new, theoretical interest in these relationships has surged in the last 15 years (Brecher and Costello 1990a; Frege, Heery et al. 2004; Reynolds 2004). Yet the scholarship on coalitions has some limitations, often focusing on best-practice case studies and assuming rather than proving if and how coalitions are a source of power for unions (Tattersall 2005).
This paper argues that coalitions can be understood as one example of a broader concept of community unionism. By defining the term community, and then using this definition as a conceptual tool, this paper explores key elements of coalitions and how those elements vary coalition success and form. In doing so, it does not seek to develop a strict benchmark definition of community unionism, where some magic threshold of engagement or campaign success represents an ideal type of practice. Rather it argues that community unionism is a deeply variable concept and by breaking down its elements, we can understand significant variation and success through concepts such as the kinds of common interest, organisational relations and multi-scalar campaign capacity present.
Furthermore, the paper argues that there is a progression of forms of power that community unionism can concretely provide unions, stretching from an instrumental to a deeper, more politically transformative power. Firstly, community unionism provides an instrumental form of power – complementing union capacity by increasing a union’s financial, physical and human resources, providing expertise and enhancing the number of union supporters (Frege, Heery et al. 2004). Secondly, community unionism provides a legitimising form of power, where union action is framed as a ‘sword of justice’ with broad community support and not simply the vested interest of unions (Flanders 1970). Thirdly, community unionism can assist unions to build an agenda for change (Reynolds 1999; Tattersall 2006b). Finally, community unionism, by creating influential relationships between unions and community organisations and by mobilising union members on a variety of issues can create change in unions themselves – community unionism may be an agent of union revitalisation (Frege, Heery et al. 2004; Tattersall 2005; Turner forthcoming). I argue that the forms of power that community unionism offers unions vary as the success and interdependent relationships between unions and community organisations deepen, thus this paper argues that there is a connection between the capacity of community unionism and the source of power that community unionism provides unions.
1. Community and Community Unionism
Community unionism has a contested and uncertain meaning, in part due to the ambiguity of the term ‘community.’ The ambiguous use of the term community makes it difficult to assess what community unionism looks like. However, while the term community is loosely deployed across union renewal literature, there are some consistent themes (Tattersall forthcoming a). Most commonly, the term community is used as a surrogate for community organisation, for example in the term union-community coalition (Brecher and Costello 1990a; Tufts 1998; Tattersall forthcoming a). Secondly community is used to describe a group of people who have common interests or identities, such as a community of women or environmentalists (Cranford and Ladd 2003; Fine 2005). Thirdly, community is used to mean place, as in a defined geographic area such as a local neighbourhood community (Ellem 2003). These three discrete definitions can be seen as complementary and supplementary, defining the attributes of community and providing a concrete anchor for exploring terms such as community unionism (Tattersall forthcoming a)
]]>Generalhttp://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=23Sat, 12 Aug 2006 11:36:00 -0700<![CDATA[Paper: Solidarity Whenever]]>
http://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=22
Presented at the ACREW Conference in Prato, July 2007
Abstract
Union renewal and union collaboration with the community is widely considered necessary. Consequently the different opportunities and choices that create the structure and agency for unions to renew is an important but under-theorised area of scholarship. This paper develops a framework using the term community and the dialectic of opportunity and choice to explore likely factors for long-term union coalitions with community organisations, then explores this framework by a comparison of union engagement in long-term coalitions in Australia and Canada. The paper finds that the dialectic of opportunities and choices is critical, and in particular emphasises the role of pre-existing union identities and decentralised union structures, the existence of crisis and opportunity, the importance of common interest and the different roles that union leaders or union factions, organisers and delegates can play in pushing for change. The paper finds that different passages for community unionism are possible, and they can be both internal to the union and come from coalitions. It also finds that the different passages for community unionism directly affect the kinds and depth of union engagement that results.
There is a hope that union renewal is possible. Terms such as social movement unionism, community unionism and organising unionism try to envisage what a renewed union movement would look like. Yet indicators of when a shift to renewal is likely are uncertain, and are often a secondary focus of renewal scholarship. Some suggest that union-community coalitions (labour-community coalitions) are one example of renewal (Frege, Heery et al. 2004; Reynolds 2004; Turner forthcoming). Long-term coalitions between unions and community organisations, or community unionism, are said to be an important source of power and renewal for unions who are suffering from a crisis of density, lack of political influence or needing to build a broader social agenda (Tattersall 2005).
This paper focuses on the question of coalitions and union collaboration with the community and considers first the meaning of the term community, and then the opportunities and choices that make collaboration more likely to occur in an individual union. The paper seeks to establish then test some possible indicators for likely union collaboration with community that are explored in two comparative case studies of unions shifting to engage with long term coalitions – the NSW Teachers Federation’s collaboration with the Public Education Alliance in Sydney Australia and the Canadian Union of Public Employees collaboration with the Ontario Health Coalition in Canada.
1. What is Community?
Terms such as union-community coalition and community unionism have a contested and uncertain meaning, in part due to the ambiguity of the term ‘community.’ The amorphous definition of the term community makes it difficult to assess what collaboration with the community looks like. However, while the term community is loosely deployed across union renewal literature, there are some consistent themes (Tattersall forthcoming). Most commonly, the term community is used as a surrogate for the phrase community organisation, for example in the term union-community coalition (Brecher and Costello 1990a; Tufts 1998). Secondly community is used to describe a group of people who have common interests or identities, such as a community of women or environmentalists (Cranford and Ladd 2003; Fine 2005). Thirdly, community is used to mean place, as in a defined geographic area such as a local neighbourhood community (Ellem 2003). These three discrete definitions can be seen as complementary and supplementary, defining the attributes of community and providing a concrete anchor for exploring terms such as union-community coalitions and community unionism (Tattersall forthcoming).
Figure 1: The threefold dimensions of community
Thus, union collaboration with the community, or what I term community unionism, can include one of three different practices (Tattersall forthcoming). It can include working with community organisations. It can include acting with a broad common ‘community’ or class interest or acting with people with a specific identity. Or, community unionism can include acting with a place-specific strategy where unions seek to work across a specific geographic area, using local support to enhance union influence and power. This paper explores one of these practices in detail – union collaboration with community organisations, asking under what circumstances is long term collaboration likely to develop.
2. When are unions likely to collaborate with ‘the community’?
Union strategies rarely develop evenly across national or international union movements; rather many internal union and environmental factors affect when the strategies unfold. Community unionism, and coalition practice in particular, has an uneven development, revealing variation within nations and between them. Yet this variation has received only limited attention, making it difficult to explain why for instance, community unionism appears more prevalent in the United States compared to the United Kingdom, or in the service industry rather than traditional blue-collar industries.
This paper presents and explores a framework for examining when long term community unionism is likely to develop in an individual union, by adapting two analytical devises. Firstly, I borrow from a recent approach of Turner that categorises the pressures that generate union change as arising from both the opportunities that surround unions and the choices internal to unions (Turner forthcoming). Secondly, I structure this approach using the three-fold definition of community. Thus I argue that there are three different community-based factors that create environmental opportunities and influence internal union choices that make union collaboration with the community more likely. When unions possess these ‘community’ attributes, I argue that community unionism is more likely to develop. Furthermore, I argue that the concept of opportunity highlights structural features that contribute towards a breadth of community unionism practice, in either places or industries, while the concept of choices highlights how internal union elements, agents or structures affect the depth of community unionism practice and engagement within a union.
2. a Opportunities
A union’s environmental and organisational context shapes the kind of strategies that it is likely to develop. The term opportunity structure, adapted from social movement theory, stresses the importance of structural and environmental factors in social movement emergence (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001; Turner forthcoming). In the coalitions literature, there are three important ‘opportunities’ that are identified and I structure these using the three definitions of community. Firstly there are opportunities in the political, economic and social environment, secondly a union’s relational opportunities, and thirdly opportunities arising from a union’s pre-existing identity.
Commonly, the external environmental context and shifting alignments of the political and economic environment is said to spur opportunities for changes in union strategy, including community unionism (Hyman 2001)[62]. A decline in legal regulatory support for unions is cited, where traditional arbitration or court-like procedures for dispute settlement become less supportive of unions, such as in the United States where comprehensive campaigning has sought to replace traditional National Labour Relations Board routes for unionisation (Savage 1998). The demise of traditional political routes for power create similar crises and opportunities for shifts towards collaboration, particularly with the rise of ‘new labour’ policies that distance social democratic parties from unions, reducing a traditional route for political influence in countries such as Australia, the United States (Wills 2002; Fine 2003; Wills 2003). It is argued that the decline of these traditional sources of union state ‘relational’ power may encourage unions to experiment and engage in collaboration as an alternative source of power.
The economic context, including collapsing union density or industrial location may particularly influence the likelihood of coalition practice. Crises such as contracting out, attacks on the public sector, privatisation or manufacturing plant closures, or opportunities for rebuilding a strong regional economy, have been met by coalitions because of the joint effect of economic policies on workers and surrounding communities (Craypo and Nissen 1993; Johnston 1994; Nissen 1995; Reynolds 2002; Greer, Byrd et al. forthcoming; Tattersall forthcoming). The direct crisis of declining union density may also influence coalition practices, seen particularly in the United States (Banks 1992; Bronfenbrenner, Freidman et al. 1998). Labour geographers have argued that industries with a spatial fix, such as some primary industries such as mining or certain human service work such as cleaning, may provide distinct opportunities for collaboration with community because this work is embedded in fixed local communities (Walsh 2000; Ellem 2003; Ellem 2005). Similarly, where work itself is decentralised in communities rather than workplaces, such as with house-bound homecare work or some front line public sector work which is located in local communities, there also may be opportunities for collaboration with other place-based organisations (Savage 1998).
Consequently, the external economic and political crisis posed by neoliberalism may in part explain why there is increasing discussion of coalitions in the last 15 years. While coalitions are certainly not new, speculation of their centrality to strategies for rebuilding union power has become more robust, more recently (Frege, Heery et al. 2004). The historical unevenness of coalition practice, and particularly current experimentation in places like the United States and Australia, may be in part shaped by this harsh economic and political context.
A union’s organisational relationships, both within the union movement and within civil society may also create opportunities for collaboration with the community. Peak councils or other unions may create an environment that supports collaboration. Ellem and Shields argue that peak councils can play a role as an agent of mobilisation, creating a culture of alliances which may in turn support individual unions engaging in alliances (Ellem and Shields 2004). Similarly, central labour councils have been held out as an agent for change in the US system, with programs such as Union Cities that employ community collaboration as a key strategy (Ness and Eimer 2001; Byrd and Rhee 2004; Luce and Nelson 2004; Reynolds 2004). Relationships with other unions may also support collaboration, through national union policies or a unions sharing strategies and learning tactics bilaterally (Garner 1989; Obach 2004). Similarly, community collaboration also requires available community allies (Tarrow 1994). Johnson argues that allies are prevalent in the public sector, where consumer groups share common interests with workers (Johnston 1994; Carpenter 2000). Community organisations vary between nations, with US organisations having a strong history of Alinksy-style community organising, yet the prevalence of Government funding or foundation funding, may limit or at least shape potential partnerships with unions. Alongside community organisations, the emergence of tightly-knit identity based networks, particularly amongst immigrant workers, may also provide opportunities for community collaboration, where ethnic identity can supplement and support the development of union identity (Clawson 2003; Fine 2003; Turner forthcoming).
Finally, pre-existing union identities may also create opportunities for collaboration. In particular, a union will be more likely to collaborate if they have an ideological or attitudinal commitment to collaboration or if a union has had past experiences with collaboration. Unions with a history of militancy, ideological radicalism or broad interest representation beyond wages and conditions may be more likely to engage in future collaboration (Hyman 1994; Robinson 2000). Whether this is political commitment to a united front, a commitment to issues beyond wages or conditions or a social justice outlook, alignment with community may be easier because a broad interest (class) perspective makes it easier to cultivate common interest (Waterman 1998; Bramble 2001; von Holdt 2002). Similarly, if union collaboration is a familiar tactic – part of a union’s ‘repertoire of contention’ – then it is more likely to be used as a strategy in the future (Tarrow 1994; Frege, Heery et al. 2004).
2. b Choices
However the development of union practice is not simply a force of nature; a union must also exercise a choice in determining whether it commits to coalition practice given the surrounding opportunities (Kochan, Katz et al. 1986; Pocock 1998; Hyman 2001; Turner forthcoming). Union choice is variable, and union strategy literature highlights the diversity of actors that can shift union strategies. This section explores these variable influences, and also considers how the kind of actors that influence union choice may shape the depth of collaboration. This issue is further explored in the comparative case studies in the second section.
Specific union actors are held out as key for causing the development of community collaboration. Leadership support most often argued to be critical for organisational change, and leadership support for collaboration practice is said to make it more likely to occur (Nissen 2000; Voss and Sherman 2000; Cooper 2001; Frege, Heery et al. 2004; Crosby 2005). Leaders can at one level support collaboration, or at a deeper level choose to directly participate in coalition decision making (Nissen 2003). In contrast, some scholars argue that ‘bottom up’ pressures are primary, presenting an idealistic picture of rank and file democratic pressure as key for promoting sustained collaboration (Moody 1997). In addition, Rose identifies an important layer of ‘bridging building’ officials that support collaboration (Rose 2000). Bridge builders have experience in the union movement and social movements which they use to facilitate collaborative relations by translating cultural and class barriers and internally influence a union to change its strategy by bringing to the union movement social movement tactics (Rose 2000; Voss and Sherman 2000). Separate to bridge builders, Cooper argues that union officials play a key role in supporting the adoption of new union strategies and countering internal resistance, and Kelly stresses the role of workplace leaders as agents who support new strategies (Kelly 1998; Cooper 2002).
A common criticism of this literature is that it identifies a particular agent as primary; that somehow leaders, the rank and file or bridge builders are the most important for achieving shifts to collaboration (Carter and Cooper 2002). As Hyman emphasises, unions contain a complex set of relations, decision making bodies and political forces that all influence the development of strategy (Hyman 1975; Hyman 1989). In the case studies I explore this question of agency, and rather than simply considering which union agent ‘causes’ the shift to collaboration, I consider how the alignment of particular types of actors affects and shapes the quality, and in particular the depth of community unionism, or long term union-community coalitions. I do this because while joining a coalition may be an act of collaboration, not all coalitions or union engagement in coalitions are the same (Tattersall 2005). In the two case studies I explore the passage of supporters and union engagement in the coalition that changes over time to try and understand how deep union collaboration develops.
There are three additional factors that shape whether a union is likely to choose community unionism: the common interests and or identity of the existing and potential union workforce, the type of coalition the union is working with and the organisational scale of the union.
The identity or common interest elements of community affect the likelihood and depth of community unionism, and the ability of the union to develop a broader class consciousness from collaborative experiences. Many scholars argue that membership diversity, and in particular a non-traditional workforce (with women or immigrants, for instance) can generate both a commitment to a broader range of issues and a depth of engagement in those issues (Needleman 1998; Nissen 2001; Clawson 2003). Member engagement is also affected by the type of issue selected for collaboration, and the ability for a burgeoning political awareness and solidarity to be connected to that issue. Thus the connection between issue and direct interest is relevant; a teacher is likely to connect to a campaign on public education because there is a direct connection between working conditions and education funding (Johnston 1994; Tattersall 2005; Tattersall forthcoming). Union education may enhance political awareness and breadth of concern, cultivating a political concern beyond issues of wages and conditions, creating a basis of solidarity beyond individual concern where personal interests are more broadly connected to industry, region or class (Freire 1972; Spencer 1994). This may also be impacted by the relative homogeneity or heterogeneity of the union itself, with unions which have a more homogenous membership having a greater ability to cultivate deep common concern than general or highly heterogeneous unions (Delaney, Jarley et al. 1996; Turner forthcoming).
The type of coalition may also affect whether it can act as a change agent, and deeply sustain and engage union participation. Union coalitions with separate, independent coordinators may have greater sustainability as they have autonomous resources that can act above vested organisational interest and assist in the creation of compromise and a sustained campaign agenda (Lipsig-Mumme 2003; Reynolds 2004; Tattersall 2005). The relative independence and separation of a coalition from a union may enable it to in turn influence the union, possibly generating change and a depth of engagement.
The organisational scale and decentralisation of decision making and leadership within a union may also vary the depth of member engagement in collaboration. At the scale of a union office, effective collaboration requires resources and dedicated staff, which also may require that larger resource rich unions are more able to afford collaborative practice (Tattersall forthcoming). The decentralisation of organisational scale and workplace leadership however, are also critical for depth of member engagement. Political consciousness and class consciousness are developed not only through vision, but through personal relationships (Thompson 1963; Wills 1998). This makes the local – local participation, decision making and leadership – critically important in order for union collaboration to reach deeply into a union (Kelly 1998). The extent to which unions have rank and file decision making structures, space for delegates or stewards to make decisions, and whether they are involved in the collaboration or the issue at the heart of collaboration will affect the depth of coalition engagement. Thus internal union decentralisation, and coalition decentralisation (and the existence of broker, locally scaled coalition organisations) are important elements that affect the depth of union engagement in coalitions (Tattersall 2006).
]]>Generalhttp://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=22Sat, 15 Jul 2006 08:10:00 -0700<![CDATA[Paper: There is Power in Coalition: a framework for assessing how and when union-community coalitions are effective and enhance union power]]>
http://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=16
Abstract
Proposals for union revitalisation suggest the importance of unions reaching out to the community and the formation of union-community coalitions. Yet analysis of how this process of ‘reaching out’ can be most effective for building union power and advancing union renewal is little understood. This paper presents a framework for assessing union-community coalitions, and how different types of coalitions offer varying possibilities for enhancing the power of unions. The framework extends from ad hoc coalitions to complex integrated ‘deep coalition’ forms. I identify a series of coalition features - common interest, structure, organisational buy-in and scale – and argue that they are key determinants of coalition variation and effectiveness. I also explore how these different coalition forms provide increasing possibilities for union power, and promote possibilities for union renewal. I argue that the possibilities for union power and union transformation are increasingly likely when there is broader and deeper interconnection between unions and community organisations within the coalition form.
Amongst the possible routes for union renewal is the suggestion that unions should reach out to the community to form union-community coalitions. Union-community coalitions are seen as a mechanism for advancing union power by building powerful alliances to rebuild union’s political and economic influence. Yet coalitions are not homogenous creatures; some last and provide an ongoing source of change and power, and others are fleeting in their political influence. This paper presents a framework of various coalition forms and breaks down their features, assessing what makes them work and how they contribute to union power and union renewal.
Coalitions and union renewal
In Unions@Work, the ACTU recommended the formation of alliances between unions and community organisations to strengthen the voice of unions (ACTU 1999). This strategy was part of a broader agenda for union renewal. Union density in Australia and many other industrialised countries has fallen dramatically over the last 20 years (Peetz 1998). Unions@Work argued for a program of union renewal, demanding that unions change how engage their membership, organise new members and relate to other organisations in civil society, in order to turn around declining density and rebuild their influence over job regulation and social policy.
Union-community coalitions are seen as an important element of union renewal. Indeed, within US union revitalisation literature it is widely claimed that union-community coalitions are a vital element in returning unions to their social movement origins (Moody 1997; Waterman 1998; Nissen 1999; Johnston 2002; Frege, Heery et al. 2004). These scholars advocate coalition practice to enhance a union’s ability to bargain as well as advocate for legislation and social policy, in a period of declining union density and influence with employers and the state.
In the Australian context, union-community coalitions have been used to increase the influence of unions in bargaining and to help build community support for union issues. The success of the 1998 Maritime Union of Australia’s community pickets gave practical credence to the idea that community support can strength union power (Tattersall 2004). Working with the community is part of the spectrum of union tactics, used in a climate of union renewal. It has become, at least rhetorically, a part of union strategy. In a February 2005 survey of NSW unions affiliated to Unions NSW, when asked ‘has the state branch of your union in the past two years worked on a campaign which involved working with community organisations?’ two-thirds said yes. Later that year, the Australian union movement’s campaign against a package of employer supported industrial reforms saw the mainstreaming of community days of action, partnerships with community organisations and community coalitions as key features of union campaign strategy.
Union revitalisation literature claims that coalitions provide three sources of power for unions. Firstly, union-community coalitions provide an instrumental form of power – complementing union capacity by increasing a union’s financial and physical resources, providing expertise and influence, and enhancing the number of supporters for unions (Frege, Heery et al. 2004). Secondly, union-community coalitions also provide a legitimising form of power, where union action is framed as a ‘sword of justice’ with broad community support and not simply the vested interest of unions (Flanders 1970). Finally, it is argued that union-community coalitions, by creating influential relationships between unions and community organisations, and by mobilising union members on a variety of issues can create change in unions themselves – union-community coalitions may be an agent of revitalisation (Moody 1997; Waterman 1998; Frege, Heery et al. 2004).
Yet, there is a dearth of theory that explains how and when union-community coalitions vary in their ability to build union power. Not all coalitions are the same, they offer remarkably diverse possibilities or limitations for unions (Frege, Heery et al. 2004). Yet this variation in practice is not accompanied by theoretical frameworks that are able to explain how differences in coalition form or practice affect coalition effectiveness or union power. There is a large body of work focused on the study of union-community coalitions, from industrial relations, social movement theory, union revitalisation and labour geography. Yet despite the growing number of labels to describe these coalitions – social movement unionism, union-community coalitions, social unionism, community unionism, social justice unionism or citizenship movement unionism – there is still significant ambiguity about what makes a coalition effective or powerful for unions. The literature on coalitions tends to be empirically driven, focused on best-practice case studies rather than drawing out the elements of coalition practice that affect coalition effectiveness or union power. As Ellem and Shields describe with reference to the theory of peak union councils, there is a need to understand how and when a union-community coalition’s power varies rather than simply hope that a ‘will to unity’ will create powerful alliances (Ellem and Shields 2004). Even more importantly for the purpose of union renewal, it is necessary to understand when and how union-community coalitions enhance union power and create change in unions.
This paper aims to open up analysis of the viability of union-community coalitions by presenting a framework on how union-community coalitions vary in their practice, and how that variation in practice contributes to union power. This paper develops four labels to describe different types of union-community coalitions – ad hoc, simple, mutual-support and deep coalitions. These four coalition types are analysed as increasingly integrated and powerful forms. The four coalitions are discussed with reference to four factors - the coalition’s common interest, its structure, the organisational buy-in and the geographic space in which they act. I then consider the implications of these different union forms for the possibilities of union power. I argue that a union’s ability to enhance the instrumental, legitimising and renewal opportunities available from coalition practice is affected by the extent to which coalitions deeply and broadly interconnect. Union power is increased if and when unions connect their coalition engagement to deeply engaging union members and establish reciprocal interdependent interconnection with community organisations.
This paper draws on literature and a series of structured interviews. These interviews are a selection of over 80 interviews undertaken in the context of case study work on long term, coalitions in Sydney, Toronto and Chicago during 2005. These case studies aim to establish how and when coalitions, as strategic agents, are most effective.
Ad hoc coalitions
The most common form of union-community coalition that unions engage in is an ad hoc, episodic coalition. These relationships involve one-off requests for support, such as invitations to participate in events (such as a picket line or a rally) or provisions of financial assistance. The coalition formed is a temporal one, lasting for the specific action at the heart of the relationship. Ad hoc coalitions often occur in reaction to a crisis, where a crisis is turned into a political opportunity to reach out to like-minded organisations and ask for support (Tarrow 1994).
These short alliances are coloured by the party who initiates them – being dominated in form and strategy by the initiating community organisation or union (Fine 2003; Fine 2005). Common examples of union-initiated ad hoc coalitions are the (often last minute) requests for a community organisation to speak at a rally or come to a picket. Common examples of community-initiated ad hoc coalitions are requests for funding or endorsement that regularly pass over the desks of union leaders.
Ad hoc coalitions are limited by the simple and distant nature of their interaction. As Lipsig-Mumme notes, these relationships can be instrumental (Lipsig-Mumme 2003), where one organisation requests transactional support from another organisation on its own terms. These relationships do not involve joint decision making, merely a request to support a pre-existing strategy. The distant nature of ad hoc interactions means that the relationship between union and community organisation is often very separate from the union membership, with the campaign often executed by union officials alone. The instrumental form of ad hoc relationships if repeated and one-sided may create animosity between partners, where community organisations feel used rather than an equal partner. For instance, in the US, the term ‘rent a collar’ has become a turn of phrase to describe ad hoc speaking requests from unions to the religious community (Anonymous author interview, Chicago Sept 2005). Ad hoc relationships between the religious community and unions are increasingly common in Australia, particularly during the 2005 Industrial Relations campaign.
Ad hoc coalitions may create possibilities for further, stronger collaboration. They build relationships between different organisations, sustaining and feeding informal connections through one-off joint actions. The very existence of ad hoc coalitions signals the possibility of greater, longer, more powerful alignment between unions and community organisations. They are regularly a first step towards stronger collaboration. This was the case for the Teachers Federation, where a long standing ad hoc alliance called ‘Three Federations’ between parents and teachers later developed into the Public Education Alliance (Author interview, Maree O’Halloran, President, Teachers Federation, May 2005).
For unions, ad hoc coalitions provide a valuable tactical resource for power while not creating long term strategically powerful relationships. Ad hoc coalitions keep community organisations at arms length; they are not brought into campaign formulation nor treated as partners, they are often ‘told’ what to do (Anonymous author interview, Chicago Sept 2005). In the event of an immediate crisis, such as a lock out or strike, a union-initiated ad hoc coalition often provides a powerful route to victory. Community support at critical times supplies legitimacy, providing a morale boost for union members and supportive media. Yet ad hoc coalitions do not of themselves create powerful strategic relationships. Rather, ad hoc coalitions create relationships between organisations which contain the possibility for greater connection, sharing and power.
Support Coalitions
Support coalitions operate as short-term, structured coalitions between unions and community organisations. They transform the ‘temporary’ ad hoc coalition to a formal meeting space as a site for event and campaign planning.
Support coalitions allow for a closer integration of common interest and organisational buy-in through a more cohesive structure. In terms of common interest, support coalitions share features with ad hoc coalitions, as the issues and interests at the heart of the coalition tend to derive from a single organisation’s agenda, rather than be shared between the groups (Frege, Heery et al. 2004). In addition, support coalitions tend to be organised around single issues, and continue only while that issue is in contention (Banks 1992). Examples vary widely and include NSW based coalitions such as the Save Medicare Alliance, the Walk against the War Coalition, each being defined by a specific issue as a common concern.
Support coalitions are categorised by a formal structure, which allows organisations to connect and share strategy. Features such as face to face meetings and ongoing communication (through email lists, telephone trees or fax streams) allows for shared decision making between the partners (Banks 1992). Although support coalitions are short-term, joint decision making processes, they allow for some sharing of the planning process. However, this formal joint ownership is often mitigated by the informal dominance of decision making by the initiating organisation (Fine 2003). If the coalition is union-initiated it will often be dominated by unions, with unions exercising both formal and informal influence over the type of action taken (Waterman 1991; Munck and Waterman 1999). If the coalition is community-initiated, it will probably struggle to get significant participation from unions, with unions often sending junior staff as coalition participants (Clawson 2003). This was certainly the case with the Walk against the War Coalition in NSW in 2003; while it had strong representation from over 15 unions, the representatives tended to be mid-ranking staff members not elected or executive officials.
Short-term, reactive support coalitions tend to limit their operation to the scale of decision makers (Lipsig-Mumme 2003). For instance, if a campaign is organised against a State Government, the coalition will concentrate on shifting the Government as a whole at the scale of the state, not acting at a more local or regional level. Limiting a coalition to a single scale makes it difficult for support coalitions to deeply engage the members of participant organisations. Union and community organisation members tend to be used as a force of defiance, such as through centrally organised rallies, rather than having meaningful ownership over locally led campaigns. Support coalitions use participant organisations to mobilise support for short-term goals, rather than working with those organisations to sustain campaigns that achieve long term shifts in power relations.
Consequently, support coalitions struggle to build deep organisational participation – participation remains one-sided, dominated by the initiating organisation. While union involvement in community-initiated support coalitions usefully provides coalition campaigns with greater financial resources, leverage or influence (Tattersall 2004), they often incompletely engage the resources or capacity of unions. Conversely, a union-initiated support coalition often makes demands on community organisations they are less able to satisfy, for instance demanding mass turn-outs for demonstration, when they are more capable of delivering supportive media or information distribution (Anonymous author interview with union official, Sydney May 2005).
Support coalitions are staged on any issue, and consequently there is little regard to the types of issues that more readily politicise union members. Often a support coalition will not directly engage union members, as the issue may be disconnected to union member’s lives, experiences or concerns. Furthermore, reliance on a coalition structure limits decision making to officials, tending to exclude union delegates or members from meaningful involvement (Clawson 2003). The narrowness of participation makes it difficult to spark locally based organising amongst union members inside unions on community issues.
Support coalitions are effective at coordinating organisations for a reactive, single-issue campaign, but they struggle to sustain mass-based engagement. Decision making is concentrated in the coalition form, which allows for co-ordination by an array of organisations. However the issue specificity and narrow organisational dominance of decision making often limits their longevity and effectiveness.
The Walk against the War Coalition in Sydney provides a useful example. This coalition was formed reactively in October 2002 in response to the possibilities of war in Iraq. The coalition was very broad, with over 90 organisations participating at its peak. Yet the frame of common interest and the type of action (repertoires of contention) that were undertaken by the group were relatively narrow.(Tarrow 1994; McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001) The diversity of the participants, from establishment organisations like unions and churches, to more anti-systemic, radical groups, made it difficult for the group to make decisions on issues outside organising the tactic of choice - street marches against the war. Union participation was focused on coalition decision making and financial and personnel support, rather than deep engagement of union members and delegates (Clawson 2003; Tattersall 2004). While the marches were large, the Coalition was limited to a narrow set of tactics (the rally) and was unable to effectively balance the diverse interests of the groups – disbanding in May 2003.
For unions, support coalitions may provide a source of power but they can also operate as a relatively superficial form of solidarity. Union-centred support coalitions allow partner community organisations to take ownership over union struggles. The formal organisational proximity of community-centred support coalitions creates a space where community organisations are more likely to harness the resources of unions. Yet because there is an insufficient commitment to the coalition’s common interest (by either unions or community), organisation involvement, sustained mobilisation and coalition effectiveness are mitigated. Union-centred support coalitions insufficiently engage community organisation support and resources, and community-centred support coalitions do not deeply engage unions. A deeper form of engagement by unions and community organisations occurs when the common interest between organisations is mutual – in mutual-support coalitions.
Mutual-Support Coalitions
A mutual-support coalition (or common-cause coalition) expands the capacity of support coalitions by extending the frame of common interest and deepening the form of decision making and union engagement within the coalition (Frege, Heery et al. 2004).
Mutual-support coalitions deepen the common interest of a support coalition, so the issue at the heart of the campaign is in the mutual self-interest of the participating organisations, not simply the direct concern of one of the parties. This complementary base of support makes it more likely that each of the participating groups has a direct interest in the success of the coalition, because the coalition’s success supports its direct organisational and political aims. The need for joint direct interest means that the ‘issue’ at the heart of the coalition is often drawn broadly. For example, rather than the aim of the coalition being to ‘demand a salary rise for childcare workers’ it may demand ‘better quality of childcare.’ This expanded issue frame allows different organisations to see their personal interest within the coalition’s common interest.
The mutual common interest of these coalitions flows over to create a close knit structure and strategy, generating stronger bonds of trust between coalition partners. The mutuality of interest becomes a vehicle for sharing decision making between the groups. The coalition becomes a space for negotiating demands to ensure each group has their specific concerns addressed. While the issue at the heart of the campaign may be drawn broadly, negotiation between coalition partners allows for the specific organisational concerns of each group to be incorporated into the coalition’s activities (Brecher 1990). Trust is more easily exchanged between partners with common goals (Tuffs 1998; Nissen 1999; Nissen 2003). Trust can also be expanded through the participation of individual bridge-builders who have experiences in both community organisations and unions, who can help translate contrasting cultural practices (Estabrook, Eduardo Siqueira et al. 2000; Rose 2000). A flat coalitional structure is able to effectively harness the contrasting power sources of community organisations and unions (Fine 2003). For instance, a mutual-support coalition may harness a union’s capacity to mobilise, a community organisation’s relationship with Government and another community organisation’s voice in the media. Sharing decision making and strategy allows mutual-support coalitions to share power.
The power and resource sharing capacities of a mutual-support alliance were evident in the NSW Public Education Alliance in 2003. The Teachers Federation played a primary role mobilising attendance at public events and financial supporting an advertising campaign around public education. The principals’ and parent groups played an important role in lobbying the Department and the Minister (Anonymous interview, Principal Representative, February 2005). Together, the Public Education Alliance was able to meet directly with the Premier about their demands, something that none of the groups had recently achieved on their own. These diverse ‘insider and outsider’ strategies led to significant policy shifts around professional development and class sizes in the 2003 State Election.
The deeper bonds between partners in a mutual-support coalition may narrow the terms of organisational participation. Mutual-support coalitions may be exclusive, because a higher threshold of trust is required (Lipsig-Mumme 2003). Mutual support coalitions are more likely to develop between organisations with long preceding informal relationships or organisations with similar cultural practices, where predictability and reciprocity are more likely to be achieved. Rather than hoping organisations will ‘buy-in’, a mutual-support coalition is more likely to evolve by hand-picking partner organisations that satisfy a standard of trust, commitment to the issue or capacity to mobilise people. This was the case with the NSW Public Education Alliance. The alliance was a relatively narrow alliance of ‘parents, principals and teachers’, only including groups that were directly connected to schools. This tight connection was an advantage, as the depth of engagement in the issue deeply connected to each organisation’s strategic interest (Author interviews, anonymous representatives Public Education Alliance, March-April 2005)
A mutual-support coalition places specific demands on unions. The broadening of common interest within a mutual-support coalition requires a union’s leadership to consciously transform how it frames its issues, connecting the union to a community movement. There is a need for the union leadership to recognise the union as a social actor not just a bargaining agent. This transition may be easier for unions already connected to the ‘community’ through the kind of work performed by their members, such as public sector unions (Johnston 1994), or in service delivery, where the work of union members directly affects members of the general public (Walsh 2000). In general, a mutual-support coalition compels union leaders to open up a union’s vision to express their demands as community concerns beyond the ‘pure and simple’ language of wages and conditions (Rose 2000). Indeed, the Public Education Alliance was preceded by significant organisational change within the Teachers Federation. Before embarking on the Alliance the union committed to a long range campaign for ‘Public Education’ and began collecting a levy of members for that purpose. The decision to shift the frame of the union’s campaign and to resource that campaign were important for the later success of the Public Education Alliance.
Indeed, mutual-support coalitions may require unions to exercise more discretion before committing to a campaign and may not be a viable strategy for all unions. The threshold of direct common interest requires more than an altruistic concern for an issue. It demands that an issue directly connect to the material concerns and needs of the union’s membership, such as when teachers campaign for public education funding. If there is not an easy connection between the issue and the union’s members, it may be difficult for a union to effectively engage in this deeper form of coalition partnership. This threshold may be achieved more easily if there is a high level of union education (Anonymous author interview, Toronto Nov 2004), or a history of militancy or radicalism in the union, but it will overwhelmingly be affected by the concerns and needs of the union members and how they connect to the issue. For instance, while the NSW Teachers Federation has an intensive union education campaign and a history of militant social justice unionism, the community union campaign that has most significant mobilised union members has been their public education campaigns (Multiple anonymous author interviews, Sydney Dec 2004-April 2005).
A consequence of mutual support coalition’s engagement of union member’s direct interest means that it is easier to activate and mobilise union members in a mutual-support coalition. The direct connection between coalition campaign and member concern provides a greater incentive to see an outcome on the issue. This increased capacity for union mobilisation increases the strength of the coalition, providing it with greater movement power (Clawson 2003; Nissen 2003).
There is a further level of coalition practice that opens up the levels of member participation, increasing the capacity of a coalition to achieve power at different scales of decision making. I call these deep coalitions.
Deep Coalitions
Coalitions are usually defined by their breadth – breadth of common interest and breadth of organisational diversity. A deep coalition supplements that breadth with a depth of organisational support. This depth creates an increased capacity to mobilise union/community organisation members. Deep coalitions are a powerful coalition form, and also a site of union renewal – to achieve deep participation, unions must open up spaces for member participation and engagement, enhancing the union’s movement capacity.
Deep coalitions increase participation by supporting a more complex organisational structure that can operate at a variety of scales. Scale is a concept used by labour geographers to understand how power is constituted and created by the place in which it operates (Sadler and Fagan 2004). Political power and corporate power are constituted by place. Political power operates at both at the scale of Government and the scale of local electorates, having both state and local dimensions. Corporate power, while often categorised by capital’s mobility can often be constrained by the local, such as in human service work or mining where there is a capital-fix that ties capital to a specific local place (Walsh 2000; Ellem 2003; Ellem 2003). Furthermore, the local can be a site for resistance for unions and community-union coalitions (Jonas 1998); it is at the local where people live, work and can directly participate in decisions and action (Wills 2004).
Deep coalitions move beyond mutual support coalitions by opening up decision making structures; instead of relying on only one coalition structure they facilitate action at a variety of scales. While a coalition may operate as the key decision maker between organisations, deep coalitions also resource, support and encourage action and connection between unions and community groups at the membership level. This decentralised structure is critical for allowing individual union and community organisation members to participate in decision making (De Martino 1999; Clawson 2003). Local decision making structures may include internal union structures, such as regional delegate councils, or local union-community structures such as electorate wide or regionally based lobby groups. This opening up process deepens the connection between the union-community campaign and union members, creating possibilities for enhanced campaign power and also for union change. Coalitions are often limited by their narrow engagement of union and community organisation leaders, not members (Clawson 2003). Effective, deep coalitions occur when unions move away from relying only on hierarchically based decision making and meaningfully engage their membership in coalition activity (Moody 1997; Nissen 1999).
Before the Public Education Alliance was launched, the NSW Teachers Federation had initiated a series of local Public Education Lobbies in Sydney and around the State. These groups were run by local parents, principals and teachers, and were designed to facilitate local lobbying and public protests. The Lobbies successfully organised a series of local forums, including a forum in South Western Sydney attended by over 600 people. This was one of the largest public meetings the union had hosted on public education (Anonymous Author Interview, March 2005 Teachers Federation organiser).
Deep coalitions require unions to create spaces for membership participation. This may occur by unions engaging their members in social questions through education programs, increasing the ability of members to take action through skill development, or supporting union delegates taking autonomous action through local decision making structures (Waterman 2001). To organise local power, unions may supplement union member participation with locally-based union-community coalitions (Jonas 1998). The effect is that a deep coalition builds the capacity to mobilise large numbers of rank-and-file members at the same time as building the connection between the union and local communities.
For example, membership participation was expanded during the Public Education campaign in 2002, when the Teachers Federation and the Parent & Citizens Federation organised an Inquiry into Public Education called the Vinson Inquiry. That Inquiry included over 30 local hearings with parents and principals around the State. Maree O’Halloran, the Union’s President recognised that this form of action assisted membership participation, the hearings ‘touched the middle teachers that doesn’t get involved in the union … they came to the meetings, with parents, everyone’ (Author Interview, O’Halloran December 2004). By taking the forms of union action out to the local school community, the union achieved a level of participation that is difficult to achieve at centrally organised union marches or meetings.
Deep coalitions are also categorised by a deeper union engagement in the central coalition. Nissen argues that union participation in a coalition is a central determinant of its success (Nissen 1999; Nissen 2003; Nissen 2004). He argues that buy-in is evidenced by a union’s willingness to mobilise in support of the campaign, the seniority and number of members or officials it gets involved in the coalitions decision making structure and its willingness to provide financial resources. This was certainly the case with the Teacher’s Federations participation in the Vinson Inquiry. The union provided most of the Inquiry’s budget, employing a research team and establishing a separate office for its operation. The union also dedicated its organisers to assist in organising local hearings. The Inquiry was the ‘main business’ of the union – deeply engaging the union at all levels (Anonymous interview, March 2005, NSW Teachers Federation Organiser).
Deep coalitions are a powerful form of coalition practice. They facilitate long-term relationships between unions and community organisations, where the breadth of activity between groups is complemented by a depth of activity by participating organisations.
Deep coalitions are also powerful for the impact they have on unions. They not only create powerful strategic relationships that enhance union power but require a process of union renewal to occur. To act with depth, unions must shift decision making power from union leaders to union organisers and delegates in order to be able to act at a variety of scales. A coalition can only be deep if unions firstly, commit their leadership to reaching out to external organisations, secondly shift their frame of vision to community-wide concerns, and thirdly empower their own delegates and members to meaningfully engage in the campaign. Deep coalition practice seeks to return trade unionism to its movement origins (Nissen 2003).
Conclusion
This paper argues that union-community coalitions vary in structure and thus effectiveness, and that these variations have flow on affects for union power. The different coalition categories developed in the paper are overviewed in Table One. While these categories are distinct, they must not be seen as prescriptive descriptors. One coalition is not ‘bad’ and another ‘good’. Instead they explain how the coalition form is variable, and that a deeper engagement between unions and community organisations creates more effective, long term, powerful alliances for lasting social change and enhanced union power.
Table One: A framework of union-community coalitions (see end)
Union-community coalitions are a feature union practice. Yet coalition types vary. This framework seeks to draw out some key features of coalitions, and see how variations in those features vary coalition practice. Thus the paper notes that factors such as increasing levels of shared common interest, increasing interdependence between unions and community organisations and increasing levels of buy-in of unions into coalition strategy will not only increase the effectiveness of coalition campaigns, but also provide a mechanism to increase union power. This framework seeks to draw out different forms of coalition practice, and explain how those variations affect the power of particular coalitions. This is critically important for reflections on the significance of this tactic for union renewal. An implication of the paper is that while the practice of union-community coalitions is an indicator of renewal, not all coalitions are equal in how they effect change, build social power or create power for unions.
It is argued that coalitions provide three key resources for unions. Firstly, they provide instrumental power – resources, influence and support. All the coalition forms demonstrate that unions can gain influence in bargaining and politics with the support of community partners. Yet, the ability for a coalition to engage that support depends on how the coalition not only engages the interests of the union, but also engages the interests of the community organisation. Mutual self-interest is a key ingredient for increasing the power of coalitions, and the power they provide unions. Secondly, coalitions provide legitimacy for union action by creating a broad community of support for union concerns. While this may be assisted by an ad hoc coalition bringing a community speaker to a rally, legitimacy is enhanced when the issues campaigned on are framed as a ‘community’ concern, for instance using a demand like public education rather than a narrower union-centric frame. Finally, coalitions can also assist the process of union renewal. They can help engage new levels of membership participation and build the capacity of the union to act at different scales – from the local as well as the scale of decision makers. This enhances union power by not only assisting a union with a campaign, but generates greater union capacity in the future.
Indeed, before unions are able to engage in deep coalitions and truly harness the capacity of union-community coalitions they must also engage in a process of internal change. While union-community coalitions may be a feature of union renewal, to be effective they require unions to change themselves. Deep coalitions require unions to commit to shared decision making and sharing power with community partners, shifting their frame of vision, and increasing the capacity for membership engagement and involvement. Coalitions are not of themselves a silver bullet for a successful campaign.
This paper has attempted to build a conceptual framework to help explain how union-community coalitions provide a mechanism to create both powerful campaigns and powerful unions, to deepen our understanding of how union engagement with union-community coalitions can create both powerful social change and more powerful unions.
References
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Clawson, D. (2003). The Next Upsurge: Labor and the New Social Movements. Ithaca, ILR Press.
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Fine, J. (2005). "'Community Unions and the Revival of the American Labor Movement.'" Politics & Society 33(1): 153-199.
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Johnston, P. (2002). "Citizenship Movement Unionism: For the Defence of Local Communities in the Global Age." Unions in a Globalized Environment: Changing Borders, Organising Boundaries, and Social Roles. B. Nissen. Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe.
Jonas, A. (1998). Investigating the Local-Global Paradox: Corporate Strategy, union Local Autonomy and Community Action in Chicago. Organising the Landscape. A. Herod. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.
Lipsig-Mumme, C. (2003). Forms of Solidarity: Trade Unions. 2004: www.actu.asn.au/organising/news/1053579943_13456.html.
McAdam, D., S. Tarrow, et al. (2001). Dynamics of Contention. New York., Cambridge University Press.
Moody, K. (1997). Workers in a Lean World. London, Verso.
Moody, K. (1997). Workers in a Lean World: unions in the International Economy. London, Verso.
Munck, R. and P. Waterman (1999). Labour Worldwide in the Era of Globalisation: Alternative Union Models in the New World Order. Hampshire, Macmillan.
Nissen, B. (1999). "Living Wage Campaigns from a "Social Movement" Perspective: The Miami Case." Labor Studies Journal(Fall): 29.
Nissen, B. (2003). "Alternative Strategic Directions for the US Labor Movement: Recent Scholarship." Labor Studies Journal 28(1): 133-155.
Nissen, B. (2004). "The Effectiveness and LImits of Labor-Community coalitions: Evidence from South Florida." Labor Studies Journal 29(1): 67.
Peetz, D. (1998). Unions in a contrary world: the future of the Australian union movement. Melbourne, Cambridge University Press.
Rose, F. (2000). Coalitions across the class divide: lessons from the labor, peace, and environmental movements. Ithaca, N.Y, Cornell University Press.
Sadler, D. and R. Fagan (2004). "'Australian Trade Unions and the Politics of Scale: reconstructing the spatiality of Industrial Relations'." Australian Geographer 80(1): 23-43.
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Primary Research
Survey
Survey of union branches affiliated to Unions NSW distributed in February 2005. Survey population was 53 union branches, and 24 responses were collected. Response rate was 46%. Survey’s were completed by Union Secretary or appointed senior member of staff. Question 28 asked ‘has the state branch of your union in the past two years worked on a campaign which involved working with community organisations? Of 24 respondents, 16 responded yes.
Interviews
Anonymous author interview, Toronto Nov 2004.
Multiple anonymous author interviews, Sydney Dec 2004-May 2005.
Author interview, Maree O’Halloran, President, Teachers Federation, May 2005.
Anonymous author interview, Sydney May 2005.
Anonymous interview, Principal Representative, February 2005.
Anonymous author interview, Teachers Federation Organiser, March 2005.
Anonymous author interview, Chicago Sept 2005.
Table 1: A framework of union-community coalitions
Ad hoc
Coalition Support
Coalition Mutual-support Coalition Deep Coalition
Common interest Specific group’s agenda/issue/event
Can be initiated by union or community organisation Specific group’s agenda/issue/event
Issue indiscriminate, no necessary connection to union members
Mutual direct interest of participating organisation Issue framed as social vision for working people
Structure and strategy Episodic engagement
Tactical not strategic engagement
Short-term coalition
Some formal shared decision making
Informal union dominance OR limited union engagement
Hasty, reactive engagement
Between organisations with different or similar political practice
Coalition includes leadership and officials
Joint decision making structure, trust
Mid-term focus and planning
Participating organisations have trust, similar culture/political practice
Decentralised structure, connections between union and community groups at membership level
Long term strategic plan to build power
Organisation/
Union participation Instrumental engagement
Campaign distant from members Union officials, campaign distant from union members
Rent-a-crowd
Union vision framed as ‘community’ issues
Some moblisations of members through union
Greater buy-in
Union actively engaging rank and file
Significant buy-in, financial resources
Scale Any place Coalition operating at same scale as decision makers
Effective longer term scale at site of decision maker Mobilising capacity at several levels, including local
]]>Generalhttp://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=16Thu, 25 May 2006 11:11:00 -0700<![CDATA[Paper: Labor's place in coalition: for the Unted Association for Labor Educators May 2006]]>
http://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=21
Labor’s place in coalition:
How and when unions build powerful labor-community coalitions
Abstract
Thomas Kochan (2005) argues for a union revitalisation that emphasises the importance of unions reaching out to the community and forming labor-community coalitions. Yet analysis of how this process of ‘reaching out’ can be most effective for building union power and advancing union renewal is inadequately understood. This paper presents a framework for assessing union-community coalitions and what makes them powerful. The framework extends from ad hoc coalitions to complex integrated ‘deep coalition’ forms. I identify a series of coalition features - common interest, structure, organizational buy-in and scale – and argue that they are key determinants of coalition variation and effectiveness. I then explore how these different coalition forms increase possibilities for labor union power, and promote strategies for union revitalisation. I argue that the possibilities for union power and union transformation are increasingly likely when there is broader and deeper interconnection between unions and community organizations within the coalition form. In discussing this framework I draw on examples of labor-community coalitions from Australia, Canada and the United States.
The crisis in union density has led to a broad debate about the possibilities for union renewal, and includes a speculation about new sources of power for unions. Amongst the litany of strategies promoted for rebuilding union power, some speculate about the promise of coalitions between unions and community organizations. Yet often analysis of effective coalition practice derives from best-practice examples rather than an analytical framework that distinguishes between the key elements of coalitions and how variation affects coalition success. This paper presents an analytical framework of four ideal-type coalitions that attempts to distinguish between coalitions according to their tactical or strategic capacity, their capacity to build short or long term power and their contribution to union renewal.
Labor-community coalitions have been identified as an important element of union strategy since the early 1990s. While not a new strategy, they have become increasingly popular in a period of declining density. High profile campaigns such as Justice for Janitors and the Living Wage campaigns have popularised coalitions (Reynolds 2004). Similarly, many Central Labor Councils have strengthened their political, electoral and social influence through building webs of labor-community networks to support working family agendas (Ness and Eimer 2001; Reynolds and Ness 2004).
Thomas Kochan, one of the US’s leading industrial relations theorists has recently called for union revitalisation that places coalition practice at the centre of a reformulated strategy for rebuilding the American Dream (Kochan 2005). Kochan’s call for coalitions represents a mainstreaming of this form of union practice, at least within industrial relations scholarship. He argues that coalitions are a vital source of power and change for unions, as they open up a broader frame of issues for union action and shift the sources of power unions’ use for campaigning; calling for union’s to help build social pressure from mobilised communities in addition to traditional tactics such as strikes.
Kochan’s claim echoes union revitalisation literature more broadly, which suggests that coalitions provide four key sources of power for unions. Firstly, labor-community coalitions provide an instrumental form of power for unions – complementing union capacity by increasing a union’s financial and physical resources, providing expertise and influence, and enhancing the number of supporters for unions (Frege, Heery et al. 2004; Tattersall 2005). Secondly, labor-community coalitions provide a legitimising form of power, where union action is framed as a ‘sword of justice’ with broad community support and not simply the vested interest of unions (Flanders 1970). Thirdly, labor-community coalitions can help unions build an agenda for change, particularly if they are long term relationships formed around a transformational issue-based agenda (that not only shifts policy but the principles under which policy is formulated) (Reynolds 1999). Finally, it is argued that labor-community coalitions, by creating influential relationships between unions and community organizations and by mobilising union members on a variety of issues can create change in unions themselves – union-community coalitions may be an agent of revitalization (Moody 1997; Waterman 1998; Frege, Heery et al. 2004; Tattersall 2005).
Yet, despite the potentially important sources of power that labor-community coalitions offer unions, not all coalitions are the same and thus the potential power they offer is highly variable. Yet this variation in practice has only recently begun to explain how differences in coalition form or practice affect coalition effectiveness or union power (Frege, Heery et al. 2004; Nissen 2004; Tattersall 2005) .
This paper explores a framework of labor-community coalitions that attempts to categorise different types of coalition practice in order to understand how these variations contribute to variations in union power. The paper develops four ideal types of labor-community coalition forms – ad hoc, simple, mutual-support and deep-movement coalitions (Tattersall 2005). These four coalition types are analysed as increasingly interdependent, powerful coalition forms. I argue, that coalitions become increasingly capable of sustaining long term powerful relationships if they both support the capacity of coalition unity and organizational autonomy in their structure, concerns and strategy (Hyman 1989). Furthermore, coalitions are most powerful if they are able to both promote a breadth of organizational participation while also stimulating a depth of organizational participation.
Yet, even where coalitions are temporal and short, they may still be powerful tactical sources of power. Indeed, in certain circumstances such as when reacting to a strike, a tactical community coalition involving religious leaders speaking against an employer abuse may be the most useful and influential form of action possible.
The purpose of the framework in this paper is to provide a method for understanding the strengths and weaknesses of different forms of labor-community alignment. It attempts to provide a framework for union practitioners and scholars to reflect on the strategic strengths and weaknesses of various forms of alignment, and to understand how these different forms of alignment provide different forms of power. The discussion of the framework features case studies and quotations from 30 interviews with unionists and community organizations in the United States between May 2005 and Jan 2006, and over 80 interviews in Australia and Canada with participants in long term labor-community coalitions.
Ad hoc coalitions
The most common form of labor-community coalition is an ad hoc, episodic coalition (Tattersall 2005). These are one-off requests for support, such as invitations for participate in community pickets or forums or provisions of financial assistance. The coalition formed is a temporal one, lasting for the duration of the event at the heart of the relationship. Ad hoc coalitions often occur in reaction to a crisis, where a crisis is turned into a political opportunity to reach out to like-minded organizations and ask for support (Tarrow 1994).
The interests and decision making within ad hoc coalitions are coloured by the party who initiates them – being dominated by the initiating community organization or union (Fine 2003). Ad hoc coalitions are limited by the simple and distant nature of their interaction. The relationships can be instrumental, where one organization requests transactional support from another on its own terms (Lipsig-Mumme 2003). The distant nature of the interaction often means that the relationship is very separate from the union membership, which may be executed by union officials acting alone. The instrumental form of the relationship, if repeated and one-sided may create animosity between partners, where community organizations feel used rather than equal. For instance, the term ‘rent a collar’ is widely used cynically in the religious community to describe the ad hoc speaking requests made by unions (Anonymous Interview, Community Organization, Chicago).
Yet aside from this instrumental base, ad hoc coalitions may create possibilities for further, stronger collaboration. Importantly, they establish and build relationships between organizations, sustaining informal connections through one off joint actions. They are regularly a first step towards stronger collaboration.
For unions, ad hoc coalitions provide a valuable tactical source of power while not creating long term strategically powerful relationships (Tattersall 2005). These episodic coalitions often keep community organizations at arms length, where they are often ‘told’ not asked what to do (Anonymous Interview, Community Organization, Chicago).
Simple Coalitions
Simple coalitions operate as short term, formally structured coalition relationships between unions and community. They are often issue based, like the Living Wage campaign, coalitions around anti-Wal-Mart site fights or plant closures.
Simple coalitions share some similarities with ad hoc coalitions, as the issues and interests at the heart of the coalition tend to derive from a single organization’s interests or agenda, rather than being shared between the groups (Frege, Heery et al. 2004). In addition, simple coalitions tend to be organized around single issues, and continue only while that issue is in contention (Banks 1992).
Simple coalitions are different from ad hoc coalitions because they have a formal decision making structure, which allows organizations to connect and share strategy. Formal features such as face to face meetings are supplemented by ongoing informal communication (such as through email lists, telephone trees or fax streams). Even though the coalitions are short-term, the joint decision making processes allows for some sharing of coalition planning and strategy. However, this formal joint ownership is often mitigated by the informal dominance of decision making by the initiating organization (Fine 2003). If the coalition is union-initiated it will often be dominated by unions, with unions exercising both formal and informal influence over the types of action taken. If it is community-initiated, it will probably struggle to get significant participation from unions, with unions sending junior staff to coalition meetings and committing limited resources (Clawson 2003).
Simple coalitions tend to limit their operation to the scale of decision makers. For instance, if a campaign is organizing against a State Government, the coalition will tend to concentrate on shifting the Government at the scale of the state – with protests and actions based in the capital city, rather than supplementing that action with more local and participatory forms of organizing. For instance, the 2003 minimum wage campaign in Illinios culminated in threatened civil disobedience and arrests inside the Capitol Building by ACORN members, with lobbying support from several key unions, as opposed to more mass-based action in congressional districts (Author interview, Community Organization, Chicago). Limiting a coalition to a single scale makes it difficult for support coalitions to deeply engage the members of participant organizations. Support coalitions use participant organizations to mobilise for short-term goals, rather than working with those organizations to sustain campaigns that achieve long term shifts in power relations.
Support coalitions tend to overly rely on the coalition structure as a space for organizational participation, limiting decision making to officials and tending to exclude union delegates or members from meaningful involvement (Clawson 2003). Thus in the Wal-Mart site fight campaign in Chicago in 2004, union members were used to collect petitions against a Wal-Mart development, rather than participating in strategy development or implementation at a local scale (Author interview, union official, Chicago).
Support coalitions are effective at coordinating organizations for short-term, action intensive, single issue campaigns but they struggle to sustain mass-based engagement. By organizing around issues, and not necessarily connecting those issues to different organizational interests, they struggle to build deep organizational commitment.
For example, many Living Wage campaigns are run by support coalitions. They are often coordinated by a long list of organizations, yet informally dominated by a few key community organizations or unions who have prioritised the issue of living wages amongst their membership, often because those members are directly affected by the issue. This was the case in Chicago, where the two major organizations involved were ACORN and SEIU 880 who each had members directly affected. Once Living Wage campaigns achieve their goal of an ordinance, it is often difficult to sustain the coalition. In the case of Chicago, some of the key organizations learnt from the ‘exhausting’ experience of the Living Wage and formed a new coalition called the grassroots collaboration, with more individual organizational autonomy (Anonymous interview, Community Organization, Chicago).
Mutual-support coalitions
A mutual-support coalition expands the capacity of a support coalition by extending the frame of common concern at the heart of the coalition to be in the mutual common interest of all participating organizations, while also deepening the forms of decision making and union engagement within the coalition (Brecher and Costello 1990a; Frege, Heery et al. 2004).
Mutual-support coalitions are distinct because the issue at the heart of the campaign is in the mutual self-interest of the participating organizations, not simply the direct concern of one or two of the parties. This complementary base of support makes it more likely that each of the participating groups has a direct interest in the success of the coalition, because the coalition’s success supports the organization’s direct organizational and political aims. The need for joint direct interest means that the ‘issue’ at the heart of the relationship is often drawn broadly. For example, rather than the aim being to demand ‘a wage increase for childcare workers’ it may be ‘better quality childcare services.’ In this case, parents and childcare workers have an equal interest stake in the issue at the heart of the coalition, because the issue is framed widely. However, the specific issues campaigned on within this frame will still need to tangibly connect to the different organizations needs. Thus, for example, a campaign for smaller worker-to-child ratios will more successfully engage the mutual interests of parents and workers than simply wage increases alone (Author interview, NSW Teachers Federation). Alternatively, as was shown in the Illinois Childcare organizing campaign, a campaign for subsidised quality meals for children in childcare mutually engaged parents and workers alike (Author interview, SEIU 880, Illinois Hunger Coalition)
The mutual interest in the coalition’s cause flows over to create a close knit structure, generating strong bonds of trust between coalition partners. The mutuality of interest becomes a vehicle for sharing decision making between the groups and negotiating issue-based demands and tactics to ensure each group has their specific concerns addressed. The structure of the relationships can also be expanded through the participation of individual bridge-builders who have experience in both community organizations and unions, who can help translate contrasting cultural practices and broker informal personal relationships to supplement formal decision making processes (Rose 2000). This is certainly the case in the Grassroots Collaborative in Chicago, where several community organizers within seniors groups and homeless organizations were previously union organizers, creating strong bonds of trust and understanding between the partner organizations (Anonymous interview, community organizations). A flat open coalitional structure can allow organizations to learn more about each others capacities, allowing the coalition to maximise, for instance, a community organization’s relationship with the media and a union’s relationship with Government (Obach 2004). Sharing decision making allows mutual-support coalitions to share power. The demands of mutual-support place a burden on community organizations and unions to recognise that other organizations have different interests, and to accommodate those needs in coalition practice. Thus, the goals of mutual-interest coalitions must adapt and change as the coalition continues.
The deeper bonds of interest and trust required for a mutual-support coalition may narrow the types of organizational partners who participate. Mutual-support coalitions may be exclusive. These coalitions are more likely to develop between organizations with long preceding informal relationships or organizations with similar cultural practices, where predictability and reciprocity are more likely (Dreiling 1998; Obach 2004). Rather than hoping organizations will ‘buy in’, a mutual-support coalition is more likely to evolve by hand-picking partner organizations that satisfy a certain threshold, such as a standard of trust, commitment to the issue or capacity to mobilise people. This is the case with Chicago’s Grassroots Collaborative which requires any potential partner to commit money to the coalition and to mobilise its members for agreed aims before it is entitled to decision making power (Anonymous interview, community organizer).
A mutual-support coalition places demands on unions. The broadening common concern requires a union’s leadership to consciously transform how it frames issues, connecting the union to a community movement and expressing demands beyond pure and simple ‘wages and conditions’ (Rose 2000). In the NSW Public Education Alliance in Australia, the President of the NSW Teachers Federation began talking on behalf of ‘parents, principals and teachers for public education’ rather than simply on behalf of the union for wages claims (Author interview, Union official, Sydney).
An advantage of a mutual-support coalition is that by engaging a union’s direct interest it is easier to activate and mobilise union members. The direct connection between a coalition campaign and member concern provides a greater incentive for a union to commit and work support the coalition. Thus for the NSW Teachers Federation, it was significantly easier for the union to resource and mobilise member participation for a campaign to reduce class-sizes and funding for public education than it was for building and sustaining union member participation in the Walk against the War Coalition, even though both in-principle were considered important (Tattersall forthcoming). The issue of public education directly tapped into deep seated concerns for ‘professionalism’, deeply engaging members ‘who don’t usually get involved in the union’, in contrast the peace campaign which engaged a ‘smaller, more political layer’ of union stewards and activists (Author interview, senior union officials).
Deep Movement Coalitions
Coalitions are usually defined by their breadth – breadth of common interest and breadth of organizational diversity. A deep coalition supplements this breadth with a depth of organizational support. There are two key features of deep movement coalitions, first is their capacity to sustain deep organizational participation at multiple scales, particularly the local scale. Secondly, a movement form of coalition is also an episodic form, achieved through intense local campaigning and mobilisation, but difficult to sustain on a permanent basis.
Deep movement coalitions are defined by an increase in participation by supporting a more complex organizational structure that can act and organize at a variety of scales (Tattersall 2005). Scale is a term used by labour geographers to understand how power is conditioned by the place in which it is contested (Sadler and Fagan 2004). The multi-scaled nature of power is self-evident in politics; political power is geographic with congressional districts and states creating the scales of popular influence over representatives. Similarly, corporate power is multi-scaled, particularly in industries such as human service work or resource extraction where there is a capital-fix that ties even global capital to specific local places (Jonas 1998; Walsh 2000; Ellem 2003; Ellem 2005). In addition, the local is an important site for participation for unions and community organizations as it is where people live, work and can directly participate in decisions and action (Jonas 1998; Wills 2002).
Deep coalitions move beyond mutual-support coalitions by creating decision making structures at multiple scales. While a coalition may operate as the key decision making space between organizational leaders, deep coalitions also resource, support and encourage action and connection between unions and community groups at a membership level. Social movement theorists use the concept of ‘broker’ to understand how a movement can operate at a variety of scales – brokerage is the process of linking action across scales (McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001; Martin and Miller 2003). They use the concept to describe individuals who act across scales, but the term can also be adapted to organizations. Coalitions may form organizations that operate at different scales to enable them to act at multiple scales. For instance, in Canada, the Ontario Health Coalition (OHC) has a province-wide coalition and 40 locally based coalitions who operate in small regional centres across the province (Author interview, OHC Coordinator). These local coalitions are able to locally direct coalition strategy, creating an agenda for action that is conscious of the idiosyncrasies of the local environment while also allowing individuals from that area to shape the strategy of the broker organization.
The second feature of deep coalitions is their movement capacity. As Flanders argues, there is a dependent relationship between ‘organization’ and ‘movement’ (Flanders 1970). While all coalitions are capable of mobilisations – turning out members to large demonstrations – a deep coalition is able to provide a meaningful engagement in the development of a movement by decentralising some decision making to union and community organization members rather than only organization leaders. In Ontario, this decentralisation in the Ontario Health Coalition allowed for sustained local participation and engagement in two episodic movement-based campaigns, firstly a door-to-door canvas campaign in 2002 and secondly a plebiscite campaign in 2005-6. Each of these campaigns were multi-scalar, with a central coalition initiating the idea, seeking buy-in from local coalitions at a Coalition Assembly and then implementing the campaign plans at a local scale (Author interview, OHC Coordinator, local coalition participants). The canvas saw the coalition conduct door-to-door canvassing in over 50 regional centres around Ontario, collecting over 300 000 signatures on a petition to save Medicare. The Plebiscite campaign has been run in six small cities, with over 80 000 people now having voting to keep hospitals publicly owned and managed, in opposition to proposals for privatisation (Author interview, OHC Coordinator). Each of these mass-based campaign were locally directed, and because they were targeting health policy at a Provincial and or national scale and replicated across the Province, they had influence at multiple scales. These ‘social movement-like’ mobilisations were not permanent; they had peaks and troughs as they escalated according to a timeline of action (Author interview, Union organizer). However, because they were participant-led mobilisations, they were able to deeply engage union and community organization members and sustain action across the Province for several months.
Finally, deep coalitions frame their issues as broad transformative agendas. As Flanders argues, unions can act with a ‘sword of justice as well as vested interest’ and a deep coalition activates that broader concern for unions to act with community organizations with a social or class-based agenda. Transformative agendas work best when their core messages are positive and rights enfranchising, as opposed to negative or exclusive. For instance, the Big Box campaign in Chicago shifted from a negative message that called for ‘no-Wal-Mart’ in the 2004 site fights to instead campaign for a Living Wage for all Big Box workers. This rights enfranchising positive message helped transform the policy making agenda in Chicago, promoting the idea that if companies are large employers in the city limits, then they have a responsibility to their workforce to pay decent wages that the city will enforce (Author interview, Community Organizer, Chicago). It was also more widely supported by City Councillors when proposed (Author interview, union organizer).
Deep movement coalitions are also powerful for the impact they have on unions. They not only create strategic relationships that enhance union power but support a process of union renewal. To act with depth, unions must create the space and capacity for union stewards to be involved in decision making and take action. A union must also commit to shift their frame of vision to community wide concerns.
Conclusion
Labor-community coalitions are potentially an important source of power for unions, however as this paper has argued, their potential varies significantly. The paper isolates several key features of coalition practice – common concern, structure, organizational buy-in and scale – and argues that variation across these features varies the source of power that a coalition can provide a campaign and unions.
The paper argues that coalitions potentially provide four sources of power for unions. All coalitions provide a basic form of power, an instrumental power, where enlisted community organizations increase a union’s capacity by offering their resources. Secondly, all labor-community coalitions provide a legitimising and moral form of power, where the enjoined community partners create a broader constituency of support for union agendas, activating a sword of justice through community spokes people and champions. However, the deeper sources of power from coalitions require more than a superficial engagement from unions. If unions commit to a broader issue base in coalition, a coalitions can help a union build a broad based social agenda, activating political awareness amongst union members and connecting union concerns for increased wages to social concerns for increased social services or standards. Finally, coalitions can, particularly when they engage union members as mutual-interest or deep coalitions, can create change in unions themselves, activating union members and enhancing union capacity.
Labor-community coalitions are not simply a static tactic in the arsenal of a comprehensive campaign. They are a variable beast, capable of supplementing the power of unions at a simple level, or transforming the capacity and agenda base of unions at a deeper level. Unions, particularly in the United States where density is such as small percentage of the workforce, are unlikely to achieve the kinds of social change required on their own. Coalitions and collaboration will be an essential ingredient of union action if unions are committed to altering the conditions of working people in the process of rebuilding their size, power and influence.
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]]>Generalhttp://edwardmcguire.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=21Fri, 12 May 2006 14:29:00 -0700<![CDATA[Paper: Bringing the Community In: Possibilities for public sector union success through community unionism]]>
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Abstract:
Public sector employment relations are increasingly difficult for public sector unions. This paper uses the concept of community unionism to explore how and when relationships between unions and community organisations may enhance union power and success in bargaining and policy reform. The paper uses a case study of the NSW Teachers Federation and their four year campaign for public education between 2001 and 2004. This case study shows the success of long term deep alliances between parents and teachers in achieving policy reform, while highlighting some limitations for community unionism strategy in salary negotiations. The paper concludes that community unionism is a viable strategy for public sector unions, and suggests that organisational relationships, common interest and multi-scalar forms of activity are important elements of success.
Keywords: public sector employment relations, labour-community coalitions; community unionism; community; union strategy.
While there is a marked decline in union density across liberal market economies, public sector union density has shown greater resilience. Public sector union density in Australia and the UK is twice that of overall density, and in New Zealand and the USA public sector density is three times that of overall density. Yet, public sector unions remain constrained in their negotiations with Governments who are fiscally conservative and criticise the narrow vested interests of unions. They are also increasingly subject to restrictions on the use of traditional forms of industrial action like the strike.
Indeed, public sector union success has been affected by the ‘crises’ of union power apparent in many industrialised countries. Public sector unions in Australia, which in the past enjoyed accommodating, consent-based relationships with Government, now experience relationships with far more conflict. In New South Wales, transport and nursing unions which have a history of non-militancy and strong relationships with the Australian Labor Party (ALP) now find themselves in protracted struggles to prevent concession bargaining (Tattersall 2004). The passage of national legislation has also restricted the types of industrial action that are available to front-line public sector workers.
In this context the NSW Teachers Federation has experimented with what might be described as community unionism. This paper first develops a framework for understanding community unionism, then documents a three year case study of the NSW Teachers Federation to assess the potential of these strategies for public sector unions.
Community Unionism
Public sector employment relations are directly connected to public services, with many non-Government organisations and local communities sharing a direct interest in the quality of the services produced. The term ‘community’ has come into vogue as a possible frame for advancing the interests of unions in an environment of declining service quality and hostile employment relations (Johnston 1994; Carpenter 2000; Terry 2000). ‘Community,’ in the form of community unionism or (labour) union-community coalitions, is said to provide a mechanism for increasing power and enhancing union success (Brecher and Costello 1990; Tuffs 1998; Reynolds 1999; Nissen 2000; Clawson 2003).
Community is one of those troublesome ‘keywords’; it is almost always invoked positively, conjuring up ideas of generalised public support (Williams 1976). This ambiguity has unsettled approaches to community unionism and labour-community coalitions, however, there are some consistent themes about the term community. Most commonly, community is used to substitute for the phrase community organisation. This slippage is so common it is built into the term labour-community coalition (Brecher and Costello 1990; Tuffs 1998; Reynolds 2004; Tattersall 2005). Secondly, community is also used to describe a group of people who have a set of common interests or identities, such as a community of women or environmentalists (Waterman 1991; Taksa 2000; Clawson 2003; Cranford and Ladd 2003; Fine 2005). Thirdly, community is also used to mean place, as in a geographic area or local neighbourhood (Patmore 1994; Jonas 1998; Savage 1998; Walsh 2000; Ellem 2003). These three definitions of community are not mutually exclusive but complementary: the greater the interaction between organisation, common interest/identity and place, the stronger the ‘community’ foundations.
Community unionism can thus be seen as a concept that describes the intersection between unions and these three forms of community. Thus the strategy of community unionism includes unions working to build power at the scale of a place, a union working with community organisations and unions working on issues of community identity (such as with immigrants, women) or on broader community issues (such as public education or peace). Within this, union-community coalitions refer to one kind of community unionism – that is coalitions between community organisations and unions.
This categorisation of community need not only be descriptive, but can guide an analytical framework for assessing when community unionism is likely to be successful. Overall, community unionism is most successful when there is an interdependent interaction between union and community (Hyman 1989). This has three dimensions. Firstly, a relational dimension, made more successful when there are interdependent, trusting coalitional relationships between community organisations and unions which are supported and sustained by individuals in each organisations (Tuffs 1998; Rose 2000; Frege, Heery et al. 2004; Obach 2004). Secondly, community unionism is made more successful when the common concern between the organisations is in the mutual interests of those organisations, deeply connected to the experiences of union members and framed as a social concern rather than a vested interest (Flanders 1970; Brecher and Costello 1990; Moody 1997). Thirdly, community unionism has a spatial dimension, made more successful when acting at multiple scales, such as the local, city, state and the national, and seizing upon and creating political opportunities (Walsh 2000; McAdam, Tarrow et al. 2001; Reynolds 2004; Ellem 2005).
This framework tries to explain successful community unionism by moving away from the empirically intensive literature that often equates successful community unionism to successful political outcomes. Community unionism is most capable of producing sustainable, long term union power through trusting, reciprocal relationships with community organisations which simultaneously build the capacity and politicisation of union members (Clawson 2003).
Community unionism may be more likely to develop in certain circumstances given opportunities such as a union’s industrial or sectoral location, the existence of a crisis or an internal commitment to union renew. While community unionism potentially has broad application, the strategy may be particularly useful for advancing union and community interests in the public sector, given the nature of public service and the crisis in public sector employment relations. A union’s industrial location may make successful engagement in community unionism more likely. Labour geographers suggest that reaching out to the community is most likely industries with a capital-fix, which includes many service-based industries (Savage 1998; Walsh 2000; Pastor 2001; Ellem 2003). Johnston suggests that community unionism is useful for public sector unions, because these workers provide services of public benefit, creating a ready constituency of consumers with an interest in improving the quality of public services (Johnston 1994). Economic crisis and crisis in traditional union strategies are also said to compel the practice of community unionism (Brecher and Costello 1990; Robinson 2000). In addition, community unionism also requires internal union ‘choices’ in response to these external political opportunities. In particular, leaders are said to play a critical role in cultivating community unionism, with community unionism often developing through a process of internal union renewal (Voss and Sherman 2000; Turner and Cornfield forthcoming).
I will examine this framework using a case study of the public education campaign run by the NSW Teachers Federation from 2001 to 2004. This case study is a qualitative study of the union and its community partners undertaken between December 2004 and May 2005. Forty one interviews were undertaken with senior officers of the community organisations and the union, union organisers and delegates, Department of Education Training officials and one former Minister of Education. Access was granted to internal union documents, union journals and Newspaper clippings between Feb 2001 and July 2004. Participant observation was undertaken at Union State Council meetings, Teachers Association meetings and union training. The case study explores how the successfulness of community unionism directly relates to the strength of relationships between the union and community organisations, the types of interests campaigned on and the scale of the campaign.
Community Unionism and the NSW Public Education Campaign
The NSW Public Education campaign was a four year campaign lead by the NSW Teachers Federation (NSWTF) in a comprehensive attempt to ‘do things differently’ by structuring their fight for improved conditions in schools as a broad-based campaign for public education (Author interview, Maree O’Halloran, NSWTF President). The NSWTF is the largest public sector union in NSW. It was formed in 1918, and represents public school teachers and teachers in the NSW- Technical and Further Education (TAFE) system (O'Brien 1987; NSWTF 2005; Tattersall 2005). Over 90% of full-time teachers are in the union and over 70% of its members are women (White 2004). It has a long history of radicalism for public education and on social issues as broad as peace and feminism (O'Brien 1987; NSWTF 2006). This radicalism has created tense relationships with the Australian Labor Party (ALP) (Author Interview, NSWTF Senior Officer). The union has a strong commitment to member involvement, with a 300 rank and file council that meets eight times per year and over 2 000 union delegates and 2 000 women’s contacts, one each in each school across the State (NSWTF 2005). The union has a regional delegate structure, with over 150 regionally-based teacher associations that meet monthly.
Background to the Case Study
The Public Education campaign grew out of a crisis in public education, and a crisis in the ability for the union to change it (Author interview, O’Halloran). The 1990s saw significant budget cuts to public education from both the State and Federal Governments (Currie 2002). At a Federal level there was a shift in funding from public schools to private schools (Watson 2003). At a State level the policy of fiscal tightening was directed at school restructures and reducing recurrent expenditure – the greatest item being teacher wages (Author Interview, former Minister for Education). Salary campaigns in the 1990s became ‘increasingly bitter,’ with condition stripping the basis for award negotiation (Author interview, O’Halloran). Evidence of the hostility is suggested by the The Daily Telegraph, whose campaign against the Teachers Federation culminated in a tabloid front-page article on the day of a strike that featured a cartoon of the Teachers Federation President drawn wearing a dunce’s cap with the slogan ‘if the cap fits!’ (Telegraph 1999).
During 1998 and 2000, the union undertook three structural innovations that attempted to rebuild the union’s ability to advance the conditions of public education (Author interview, Organiser, NSWTF). A group of teachers and organisers, mainly based in the South-Western suburbs of Sydney, an area of socio-economic disadvantage, began planning a program of new union strategies (Author interviews, NSWTF Organisers). The first initiative was to establish the Public Education Levy, a membership levy to assist the union to campaign proactively on public education through the commercial media and in the community. The second innovation was the development of Public Education Lobbies: locally-based lobby groups, the same size as Federal Electorate Districts, operating as advocacy group for public education, run by a local parent, local teacher and local principle (Zadkovich 1999). Thirdly, the union’s leadership decided to change its relationship with principals, committing to a stronger relationship between Teachers and Principal Associations as key allies in public education.
These three examples of union renewal enabled the union to embark on a broad strategy of community unionism. The community unionism featured three elements. Firstly, the union formed closer relationships, and eventually a formal coalition with the Principal Associations (Secondary Principals Council, Primary Principals Association and Public Schools Principals Forum) and Parent Groups (the Federation of Parents & Citizens (P&C) and the Federation of School Community Organisations (FOSCO). Secondly the union shifted to frame all its campaigns as campaigns for public education. Thirdly, the union established capacity at a local as well as a state level in order to build member participation, political influence and public awareness about publication education. We can analyse how variations in the relational, interest and scalar elements of the campaign shape the effectiveness of the community unionism strategy over the four campaign phases of the public education campaign.
Period One: Federal Election, Jan -Nov 2001
The public education campaign began with the aim of influencing the outcome of the 2001 Federal Election. The Election campaign consisted of a series of ad hoc events. It began with an advertising campaign focused on the merits of public education, then extended locally as the new public education lobbies undertook forums and meetings with politicians. The major activity was a Public Education Convention on September 8. Planning was coordinated by the Teachers Federation, with the other partners consulted to draft a joint statement and encouraged to bring people to the event (Author interview, Principal Representative). The Convention was attended by over 10 000 people in a space that fits 30 000, with the audience addressed by politicians from the major political parties. Teachers Federation organisers described the event positively, one even called it ‘groundbreaking’ (Author Interview, Teachers Organiser). Yet, many of the principal and parent representatives who were less involved had quite modest reflections (Author interview, Principal Representative). In the end, the issue of education was overshadowed; September 11, refugees and border control dominated the election, and saw the conservative Government re-elected (Marr and Wilkinson 2003).
Period Two: Vinson Inquiry, March 2001-August 2002
The Vinson Inquiry was an independent Public Inquiry into Public Education. It was a political opportunity created by the Teachers Federation and the P&C in response to repeated restructuring proposals from the NSW State Government. The State Government’s Building the Future proposal, released in March 2001, recommended the closure of 13 schools, and was immediately opposed by inner city communities through wildcat strikes and public meetings (O'Halloran 2001). The union initially called for the Government to review its proposals through a Government Inquiry, then, during its April Executive meeting one rank and file representative exclaimed ‘why don’t we just do a review ourselves’ (Author interview, Simpson, former NSWTF President). With the Public Education Levy, which had accumulated over $1 million, an independent review, while expensive, was possible.
The Vinson Inquiry was born of a tight formal partnership between the P&C and the Teachers Federation. This partnership across the ‘education community’ had the legitimacy to comment on the future of public education (Author Interview, Gavrielatos then Senior Vice-President NSWTF). A committee with representatives from the NSWTF and P&C was responsible for the day-to-day operation of the Inquiry. It appointed an Inquiry head, Tony Vinson, an Emeritus Professor of Education at the University of Sydney, who had previous experience in reviewing Government Services. He established a separate body to undertake the Inquiry, setting up an office in separate premises, hiring a research team and given control over discretionary funds provided mainly by the Federation’s Public Education Levy, but also by the P&C.
The Inquiry’s independent status gave it authority within Government and amongst the partner groups. Vinson independently sought out a constructive relationship with the ALP Government and the Department of Education and Training, requesting their support as a condition for the inquiry proceeding (Author interview, Tony Vinson). Although it was created by the parents and teachers, the inquiry sat above them, allowing it to focus on the common concerns of education and not conflicts of interest. The Inquiry looked like a formal Government Inquiry, with submissions, hearings and public meetings. But it was also consciously structured to increase awareness about public education for the 2003 State Election and to maximise teacher and parent participation. The union constantly used mass-based activities for every stage of the Inquiry. Submissions were advertised in the major daily newspapers, the Inquiry was launched through a Sky Channel meeting, 772 Submissions were received and the Inquiry held 28 public meetings and school visits across the State (Vinson 2002).
During the Inquiry, the Teachers Federation began to broaden how it framed its campaigns in the media and how it engaged its members. Maree O’Halloran, NSWTF President recalls ‘I made an effort … of saying parents, principals and teachers say’ not just speaking as the union, but as the education community (Author interview, O’Halloran). Union members were key participants in the Inquiry, which required them to reflect on public education. Sue Simpson, former President noted ‘it is a more engaging collective process to write a submission compared to a strike which can be organised in an individualised way … this was deeply collective and participatory (Author interview, Simpson). The activities of the Inquiry constantly engaged the union membership on issues beyond wages about the education system.
The Inquiry’s hearings lasted for six months and allowed it to operate simultaneously at the local scale and the scale of the State. The hearings were school-based events, inviting teachers and parents to air their grievances and make recommendations, generating a deep level of rank and file participation. As Maree O’Halloran commented ‘it touched the middle teacher that doesn’t get involved in their union’ (Author interview, O’Halloran). The hearings were also a vehicle for media attention, as a senior official noted ‘there was hardly a day where there was not a story about public education’ (Author interview, Gavrielatos).
The Inquiry developed a research agenda on the future of public education, synthesising the concerns of teachers, parents and principals into a positive vision (Vinson 2002). The issue of public education was broad enough to mutually and directly engage the organisational interests of the NSW Teachers Federation and the P&C, and rank and file teachers and parents. Teachers and parents have a direct interest in public education funding, and by asking them to raise specific grievances, the Inquiry engaged the rank and file on their specific concerns. This intermixing of broad interest and specific issues enabled the common concern at the heart of the coalition to act as a mobilising, participatory force that deeply engaged the rank and file.
Period Three: The State Election, August 2002 to March 2003
The NSW Teachers Federation formed the Public Education Alliance with a group of six public education partners to win targeted reforms identified by the Vinson Inquiry during the 2003 State Election.
The Public Education Alliance evolved out of the coalition initiated during the Inquiry and Federal Election (Author Interview, O’Halloran). The Alliance sought to create a ‘united front … of parents, teachers and principals speaking with a united voice’ (Author interview, Principal Representative). It operated through irregular but constant meetings held at the Teachers Federation which were attended by the senior executive officers of all of the participating organisations (Author interview, Principal Representative). The participants put aside differences within the Alliance, as one representative acknowledged:
‘I wouldn’t say we are close now as individuals, but when it comes to a public face in terms of pursuing those ideas for public education, well then we are buddies (Author interview, Principal Representative).
The Alliance negotiated through its differences in formulating six United Demands for the election campaign. The Teachers Federation prepared the initial draft of demands, then ‘shopped it around’ for discussion (Author interview, O’Halloran). Other groups then amended the documents, as a representative from FOSCO describes, ‘we always had the power to veto … anything that we didn’t approve of’ (Author interview, Allen, FOSCO). The Demands included reducing class sizes, improving school maintenance, supporting quality teachers and professional development. The Demands sought to balance the specific interests of individual organisations within a broad interest frame of public education – binding organisations to the campaign through their own self-interest. As one Principal noted ‘we were all encompassed by those recommendations’ (Author interview, Principal Representative).
The major controversy was how the Alliance framed its concern for salaries. The Teachers Federation knew it ‘couldn’t get away without having salaries there’ in the united demands (Author interview, O’Halloran). After the election, the union would move into salary negotiations. Mentioning salaries would offset disquiet in the union’s membership that the Federation was forgetting its core responsibilities (Author interview, Federation official). However, the parent groups, particularly FOSCO, were equally adamant that salaries would not be mentioned, arguing it was ‘inappropriate,’ fearing that this issue would overshadow the Alliance, given the dominant role the union was already playing (Author interview, Parent representative, Feb 2005). Eventually the Federation compromised, with the United Demands calling for ‘the development of strategies to attract and retain teachers in an era of teacher shortage’, which was a way of expressing a need for salary justice to union members without mentioning the word salaries.
This controversy reveals a limitation in how community unionism establishes common concerns. While an alliance flourishes on issues of mutual common interest, organisations also have autonomous internal needs that must also be satisfied. For unions, salaries are inevitably a concern as wage justice is a key reason why people join unions. The art of coalition practice is balancing organisational interdependence – the contradiction between autonomous organisational needs and common unity (Hyman 1989).
The Alliance planned a series of joint events in the lead up to the State Election to secure its demands. The events were focused at the scale of the State Government – where the key decision makers were based. The Public Education Lobbies did undertake local activities – displaying school signs that said ‘public education is the issue,’ and continued with local lobbying. But the momentum was drawn to State-based events – including central lobbying of key politicians and a State Public Education Forum.
The Alliance’s agenda setting power created political opportunities. In November 2002, the Opposition leader in the NSW Parliament endorsed the Alliance’s demands over class-sizes five months before the election (Totaro 2002). This escalated pressure upon the Government. The Alliance met with the Premier (Government Leader) on 22 January, an incredible achievement given the Teachers Federation had not met with the Premier in years (Author interview, O’Halloran). The Alliance also hosted a Public Education Forum on 16 February 2003. Unlike the Convention in 2001 – this forum was meticulously planned within the Alliance and was ‘packed to the rafters’ mainly with teachers, but also with parents bussed in from around the city (Author interview, Principal Representative). This escalation of public and private pressure created political success with the Government announcing it would reduce class sizes and increase funding for professional development two weeks out from the election (Doherty 2003).
Period Four: The Salaries Campaign, March 2003 to May 2004
The final stage of the Public Education campaign saw a rapid deterioration of the close relationships built over the last 2 years. The public education agenda set up the teachers’ salary campaign. As Angelo Gavrielatos noted, ‘we had created a platform from which we were able to launch into salaries (Author interview, Gavrielatos). Indeed, the momentum gave the union an early meeting with the Premier, and to the Federation’s shock, an early pay offer. The offer of a 6% wage increase over 2 years was significantly below union expectations, but it was a dramatically better starting point than the concession bargaining of the 1990s. The Government’s strategy was to make an offer and push for arbitration using the NSW Industrial Relation’s Commission’s powers to hear demands for pay claims and determine an independent settlement (Author interview, Department Official).
The Federation prepared for Commission hearings on shifting ground. One problem was that the union had not secured a commitment from the Government to fully fund any pay recommendations. A fear was that if the Industrial Relations Commission awarded a pay increase above 6%, then the Government would pay for that increase out of the existing public education budget – in effect cutting money from schools to pay for teacher salaries. Secondly, there was an organisational problem. During 2002 the P&C experienced an acrimonious change in leadership. The new leadership of the P&C prioritised building a stronger relationship with the Government, distancing the P&C from the Teachers Federation (Author interviews, Parent representatives). Thirdly, the Teachers Federation decided to campaign on salaries alone. The Commission hearings took the union into a courtroom separated from the public agenda it had just created. While the union brought their members into the courtroom and ran a public campaign around the hearings, they distanced themselves from their education partners. For instance, the Teachers Federation produced a pamphlet about their pay claim that they circulated in the Sunday newspapers, which talked about ‘parents’ without consulting the parents first (Author interview, Union official). Union interviews suggest that these entwined issues pulled previously close relationships apart, reducing trust between parents and teachers (Author interview, NSWTF Official).
The campaign events were organised by the union and were industrial, not community focused. The rallies had only union speakers, the first had only speakers from the Federation, and the second added the Secretary of Unions NSW (Central Labour Council in NSW). Similarly media commentary focused on the percentage of wage increase that was being offered, and union advertisements also narrowly focused on the issue of teacher pay, rather than the link between pay and quality education (NSWTF 2003).
Further pressure came from the Government who placed sought to influence the Commission in the lead up to it making its award (Author interview, O’Halloran). The Premier ‘warned’ the Commission not to hand out ‘affordable wage increases, and then opened the Salaries case to lodge evidence about incapacity to pay wage increases (Dixon 2004).
The Government’s aggression inadvertently changed the political opportunities of the campaign, shifting the issue from the quantum of pay to fully-funding the pay rise. The Federation believed that its hurdle to a pay rise now would be whether the Government would fund an award made by the Commission (Author interview, O’Halloran). With this broader frame, the Federation reached out to its education partners and its members. It staged a strike and leafleted parents at schools, arguing that full funding was in the interests of the public education community as it protected the public education budget (Zadkovich 2004).
The Commission handed down their award creating a 12.5% pay increase, much lower than the Federation had hoped. But, by this stage the union was focused on the issue of full funding and was galvanising the public education community. This shift in message was reflected in media reports: for instance, The Daily Telegraph noted ‘this is not the usual fight by teachers over money, this has become a fight for the survival of a valued and quality public education system’ (Parker 2004). In this context, the Federation prepared for a state-wide strike on 25 June over full-funding.
The union’s strategy was magnified by a historic vote at the P&C. For the first time since the 1980s, the P&C voted to support the strike. It was a controversial vote too, because the motion was not supported by the President of the P&C (Author interview, Parent Representative). That afternoon, news of the vote hit the press (Author interview, Parent Representative). The next day, and the day before the strike the Government changed its policy and came out in support of full funding (Burke 2004). In Maree O’Halloran’s opinion, the support of the P&C ‘kicked the balance in terms of full funding and was why we got it in the end’ (Author interview, O’Halloran). This support came even while there was poor relationship between the leaders of the two organisations. Beneath the leadership, officials in both parent and teacher groups had continued to talk, and those relationships had generated the support that cemented the teachers’ victory (Author interview, Parent Representative).
Reflections on the Campaign
The community unionism strategy across the four phases of the public education campaign varied significantly. It began as a formal coalition, dominated by the Teachers Federation during the Federal Election. Its most successful period was the deep coalition during the Vinson Inquiry, which engaged parents and teacher organisations and members through a tight organisational structure, strong mutual interest and participatory activities at both the local and State scales. This deep relationship evolved into a formal mutual-interest coalition, called the Public Education Alliance, which focused on action at the Scale of the State while maintaining a set of concerns that engaged organisational self-interest through the frame of public education. Finally, the relationships significantly deteriorated during the salaries campaign, where a change of organisational leadership, the slippage into an industrial campaign and the space of the industrial relations commission undermined deep organisational relationships. That said, during the full-funding aspect of the salaries campaign, the ad hoc relationship between parents and teachers was able to secure support that enabled a victory.
The three elements of community unionism help explain how the success of these strategies varied. Firstly, relationships were critical. The organisational dominance of the Federation in the Federal Election campaign mitigated other organisations’ involvement. Yet the deep relationships of the Vinson Inquiry, assisted by the formation of a separate ‘coalition office’ in the form of Vinson’s research team, helped the organisations find common ground. The Public Education Alliance provided a space for negotiation and planning, where differences over salaries could be debated. The change in leadership at the P&C before the Salaries campaign altered the organisational relationships, and was one factor that contributed to a weakening of the community unionism during the salaries campaign.
Secondly, common concern was critical. The Vinson Inquiry, with its broad common interest around public education allowed individual teachers to connect education to their personal experiences, deeply engaging members. The negotiated united demands of the public education alliance also facilitated organisational commitment through organisational self-interest. The lack of mutuality over the issue of salaries, exacerbated by the fact that the Teachers Federation framed the campaign as an industrial campaign, mitigated the formation of common interest and thus mitigated the success of the campaign.
Thirdly, community unionism success also relied on the campaign operating at multiple scales, so that rank and file members as well as organisational leaders were engaged in the campaign (Clawson 2003). The public education lobbies established campaign capacity at multiple scales, which was deepened by the participatory processes of the Vinson Inquiry. These deep engagements were not as deeply sustained as the campaign moved into achieving outcomes, first through the State Election campaign and then through the Salaries campaign. The movement of the Salaries campaign into the Industrial Relations Commission and into an industrial frame reduced the perceived need for multi-scaled action.
The analytical framework of relationships, common concern and multi-scaled action help explain the varying successfulness of community unionism that goes beyond a superficial equation of political outcomes with a successful strategy. In this case study, the community unionism was powerful not simply because smaller class sizes or full-funding were achieved, but because deep relationships between organisations and individuals flourished, union member engagement was expanded and an agenda for public education was created. These achievements do not simply represent outcomes, but a transformed capacity for the union and for the coalition, and signify the emergence of a variable but strong community unionism.
Conclusion
Public sector unions have the capacity to use their role as public service providers as a ‘sword of justice’ to enhance their power in public sector employment relations (Flanders 1970). This case study demonstrates key possibilities and limitations for community unionism as a public sector strategy. Public sector unions can utilise a variety of opportunities that support the development of community unionism. Confirming Johnston’s argument about public sector social movement unionism and Walsh and Savage’s arguments about service unionism, the Teachers Federation’s location in a public, capital-fixed service-based industry, with local workplaces that interact with a stable ‘customer’ base, provided a steady, organised constituency of parents and principals, committed to supporting public education (Savage 1998; Johnston 2000; Walsh 2000).
The development of community unionism in the Federation arose out of an environmental crisis that triggered an internal union crisis and structural change (Voss and Sherman 2000). The structural innovations of membership fees and local lobbies contributed to a powerful community unionism, as they enabled the union to finance and resource multi-scaled campaigns. In addition, the union’s pre-existing internal capacity, with large numbers of delegates and regional associations supported the multi-scaled campaign.
Community unionism may also have limitations, particularly when it comes to the issue of salaries. While the broad issue of public education was in the mutual interest of all the partners, the issue of salaries – a core concern of the union – was controversial. The case study demonstrates that salaries can be an issue of conflict, while also showing that it does not have to be the case. This salaries campaign broke down because of how it was run given the decline in consultation between the parties; yet relationships were able to be rebuilt when the campaign shifted to full-funding and quality education. These are variables and while salaries campaigns present a challenge to community unionism, there is not evidence that these are insurmountable barriers effective community unionism.
From the experience of the public education campaign, we can speculate about the applicability of this strategy across public sector unions and public sector employment relations. The idea of a constituency of service recipients that is organised in a local area is a common across public sector industries, particularly for front-line public sector workers like public transport, police and emergency services, health care and childcare (Pastor 2001, 275). Public sector unions generally negotiate wage claims in an environment of fiscal crisis that often includes privatisation. These issues deeply affect union members by affecting the capacity of a union to bargain. In such circumstances, a broad-based community campaign not only enhances the power of a public sector union, but provides a proactive frame for the campaign – a union becomes ‘for’ quality, public services, rather than reactively against privatisation or wage cuts. In addition, public sector unions, by having relatively strong union density and a larger pool of union members may also have the internal financial and human resources capable of mounting a community union strategy. Yet variables still remain, and success will depend on the ability of a public sector union to mobilise its own membership base and the supportiveness of union leadership.
This study demonstrates that community unionism is not a simple recipe for union power or union success. Rather, community unionism varies over time, given the shifting relationships between the organisations, the changing issues at the heart of the campaign and the capacity to resource local as well as state and national activity and organisation. Community unionism has the potential to enhance the success of public sector unions in achieving policy reform, political influence and bargaining outcomes. However the success of these strategies is a product of the dynamic political opportunities, relationships and interests evident in particular campaigns.
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